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Three Essays on Inside Debt 
Reilly White, Ph.D. 
University of Connecticut, 2013 
This dissertation consists of three essays examining issues related to executive inside debt on firm risk, 
dividend policy, and compensation structure. In the first essay, we use a hand-collected executive pension 
database to study how both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation structures affect the overall risk 
of a firm. We extend the research of Sundaram and Yermack (2007) to non-CEO executives for the first 
time, demonstrate how the difference in compensation leverage between CEO and non-CEO executives is 
directly related to firm risk, and find that funding these pensions via a Rabbi Trust eliminates most of the 
risk-shifting effects.  
 
In the second essay, we show that (i) dividend yield and dividend payout ratio are significantly lower 
when manager compensation relies more on pension payouts; (ii) given a general payout policy, managers 
will prefer the form of stock repurchase over cash dividend distribution; and (iii) the negative effect of 
pension on dividend is significantly weaker when the pensions are protected in a pre-funding rabbi trust. 
These findings provide support to the manager-owner agency theory.  
 
In the third essay, we recalibrate the Dittmann and Maug (2007) principal-agent model with a pension 
factor to determine the new optimal structure of executive pay. Using a hand-collected data set of 828 
executives from 141 firms, we calculate the optimal piecewise linear contract. This study provides a 
significantly refined answer to the original paper, and furthermore, finds little justification for high levels 
of pension compensation. Finally, we find that the pensions drive a substantial amount of contract 
mispricing among CEOs, but not for non-CEO executives. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Between 2000 and 2009, the actuarial present value of CEO pensions at the largest US firms 
increased 138%, while non-CEO executives saw an increase of 61%. During the same period, 
average salaries and bonuses for both CEO and non-CEO executives declined. These changes 
highlight a fundamental shift in the nature of executive compensation: once salary-based, then 
frequently equity based, large firms are now becoming increasingly reliant on debt-like 
compensation (i.e., pensions and deferred compensation) to attract and retain executive talent. 
Principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) predicts that executive compensation in 
the form of “inside debt,” has a number of perverse incentives, most notably an increase of risk 
aversion on the part of CEOs, especially as they get older and approach retirement age. Indeed, 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) document such behavior; using a sample of Fortune 500 firms, 
they find that CEOs with high levels of inside debt are associated with lower firm default risk. 
As predicted by agency theory, CEOs display less appetite for risk when a substantial portion of 
their pay is in the form of an IOU. While this behavior may be optimal for the CEO, it is 
certainly not in the best interest of current stockholders who sign the pay check. 
As noted by Jensen and Meckling (1976), stockholders may reduce this agency cost by 
designing a CEO’s compensation package with the same proportion of debt and equity as are 
currently in place for the firm’s capital structure. But this prescription may be less than optimal 
for many firms as well as CEOs. For example, younger executives may prefer a lower level of 
compensation leverage because they retirement is not in their plan; similarly, firms in a mature 
industry may offer less inside debt to incentivize executives to look for growth opportunities. 
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In this paper we show that shareholders have at their disposal two additional levers to 
neutralize the perverse incentives created by inside debt. The first is to design a significantly 
different compensation packages for non-CEOs vis-à-vis the CEO. We provide empirical 
evidence for the proposition that non-CEOs with low levels of compensation leverage, acting in 
their best interest, may be able to neutralize the CEOs aversion to risk. The second is to use a 
“Rabbi Trust” to fund the CEO’s retirement plan.  
Most executive pensions are funded via supplemental executive retirement plans, or SERPs, 
a designation that allows firms to exceed IRS rules on the maximum annual pension benefit. 
However, we find that a small but significant number of firms prefund executive pensions via 
Rabbi Trusts. These trusts may be attractive to executives because they are irrevocable, and 
while they offer little protection from creditors in case of bankruptcy, they provide substantial 
assurance to executives that their pension entitlements remain intact. For example, if current 
managerial decisions lead to financial distress, after the current CEO has left the firm, the funds 
cannot be removed from the trust. Our empirical evidence suggests that funding pensions via a 
Rabbi Trust effectively eliminates the risk-shifting behavior. 
Our results are based on a hand-collected pension and compensation database of top 
executives at 272 firms from 2000 to 2009. Our sample is similar to that of Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007); however, by including non-CEO pensions, we are able to extend their sample 
size fourfold. Our study confirms that larger firms and firms without major liquidity constraints 
are more likely to offer executive pensions. Non-CEO executive turnover is more likely to be 
determined by ownership in the firm and less likely by stock performance than their CEO 
counterparts. When analyzed separately, high leverage CEOs and non-CEO executives have a 
pronounced effect on reducing firm default risk.  Both groups, incentivized to act conservatively 
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by their compensation leverage structure, reduce firm default risk by approximately 0.2 standard 
deviations. We find, however, that the leverage difference between CEO and non-CEO 
executives plays a significant role in determining the overall risk of a firm. Firms with the lowest 
leverage gap difference between CEO and non-CEO executives are most likely to observe the 
agency costs associated with high levered CEOs; conversely, firms where CEO and non-CEO 
executives are compensated most differently neutralize this effect. 
We are also the first paper to consider how prefunding executive pensions via ‘Rabbi Trusts’ 
affects firm risk levels. Rabbi Trusts are created by an originating firm to allow a legal way to 
fund supplemental executive retirement plans for their executives. In our sample, 24% of firms 
offered pre-funded pensions via a Rabbi Trust. Using a 2SLS instrumental variable approach, we 
observe that firms who fund their pensions eliminate the conservative risk-shifting effects that 
high compensation leverage has on firm risk. This has substantial implications for firms who 
wish to ensure executives are offered competitive compensation, but are concerned about the 
resulting agency effects.  
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the relevant literature, Section 3 
considers the theory and methodology behind the calculations made, Section 4 consists of an 
overview of this unique dataset, Section 5 presents and discusses the results, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
The story of executive pay mix and individual CEO behavior begins with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), which laid the fundamental groundwork for agency theory. They put forth the 
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hypothesis that the best way to mitigate agency problems is to set managers’ pay with a mix of 
debt and equity that matches the firm’s capital structure. If managers receive only equity 
compensation, the result would be suboptimal for the manager, who would only receive a 
fraction of the expended effort,  On the other hand, too much debt-based compensation may lead 
to overly conservative risk management style. To overcome this ‘risk-shifting’ behavior, Jensen 
and Meckling argue that the optimal compensation mix is one that mirrors the capital structure of 
the firm.  
Along the same line, the theory developed by John and John (1993) predicts a positive 
relationship between leverage ratio of the firm and that of executive compensation. More 
recently, Edmans and Liu (2011) develop a theoretical framework for inside debt. Their theory 
suggests that high levels of inside debt serve as a superior way to compensate executives in firms 
near bankruptcy, since this unites the executives’ personal financial interests with preserving the 
existence of the firm. This result also ties in with a growing body of research suggesting that for 
different firms, different compensation structures should be applied depending on firm 
characteristics. 
Empirical evidence by Sundaram and Yermack (2007) suggests that, in actuality, 
compensation schemes do not necessary follow the prescriptions advocated by agency theory. 
They sample 237 Fortune 500 companies, over a seven-years period, and find that indeed high 
executive compensation leverage is associated with a conservative risk management style. It 
appears that managers do pay attention to default risk especially when their pensions and 
deferred compensation are at stake.  
In the last few years, the work of Sundaram and Yermack has sparked a new stream of 
research on managerial incentives created by high levels of inside debt. Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, 
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and Stuart (2012) find empirical support for the notion that CEOs with large compensation 
leverage actively manage firm assets so as to reduce overall firm financial risk. Wang, Xie, and 
Xin (2010) find that CEOs with larger pensions and deferred compensation are able to obtain 
bank loans at significantly lower spreads. Anantharam, Fang, and Gong (2010) use a smaller 
sample of pension data (2006-2008) from Execucomp and find that managers with higher 
compensation leverage obtain outside debt at a lower cost and less restrictive debt covenants. 
Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and White (2012) find that differences (positive or negative) between the 
compensation leverage and firm leverage lead managers to take larger deviations from the 
optimal investment policy. Last, Wei and Yermack (2011) confirm that high levels of pension 
compensation correspond to lower risk levels and a decline in firm enterprise value.  
 
3.   Methodology 
 
3a.  Computing Pension Data 
Pensions, as defined here, refer to Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans, or SERPs. 
SERPs allow executives to receive retirement benefits far greater than they would be normally 
entitled to under federal insurance guidelines. These pension benefits represent unfunded and 
unsecured debt claims against the firm, and in the event of insolvency, have equal standing with 
other unsecured creditors. The disclosure for pension valuation became significantly more 
transparent in 2006; prior to this period, some calculation was needed to evaluate executive 
pensions. 
The database for this study consist of  hand-collected data for 272 firms drawn from the 700 
largest companies by market capitalization over a 10-year period (2000-2009). Instead of a CEO-
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only database, all firm executives (typically five per firm year) are used to compute inside debt 
in this study. The resulting sample includes three additional years and approximately six times 
more firm-year data points than the original Sundaram and Yermack sample. 
SEC statements, as a rule, require the summary compensation information for the CEO, 
CFO, and three other executives. Frequently, more than five executives have information 
available due to changes in management, or as a function of corporate reporting policy. Prior to 
July 2006, the SEC required that pension values be expressed in a tabled matrix of the form 
given in Table A1. The actual present value of the benefit was not required to be presented, but 
the value could be inferred and estimated by an investor using the procedure outlined in the next 
paragraphs. Firms with fiscal years on or after December 15, 2006 were required to adopt a new 
presentation that included a computation of formal present value calculations. 
To ensure that the pension computation calculations are comparable and contiguous, we 
maintain the same format whenever possible. However, both the pre-2006 ‘hand-collection’ and 
post-2006 ‘company provided’ pension values employ similar calculation methodologies. For a 
small number of cases, it was impossible to calculate by hand the actuarial pension values after 
2006. In such cases, we used the company provided values; this should not have a substantial 
effect on the integrity of the overall dataset.  The established method for computing pension 
values is the actuarial present value method, detailed and explained in the two equations below. 
A guided example using ConocoPhillips is provided in Appendix A1 to clarify the calculation 
procedure.  
The present value of a pension annuity is expressed by Equation A1: 
 
∑
 ( ) 
(   ) 
   
     (    )
 
 
(1) 
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Where X is defined as the amount of the annual pension, A is the current age of the executive, R 
is the minimum retirement age to achieve full retirement benefit, K is the final year of the 
pension, and p(n) is the probability that the executive will be alive in n years. Using the ‘Period 
Life Table’, an actuarial life table available from the Social Security administration, the mortality 
probabilities for an executive of age A can be projected. While it is hypothetically possible an 
executive can receive a pension benefit indefinitely, the mortality projections of the Social 
Security administration end at 119 years, so K is for practical purposes set at 120 following 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007). 
The discount rate, d, is defined as the annualized Moody’s Seasoned Aaa bond-rating for a 
given year, taken from the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release 1 . The firms maintaining 
pensions tend to be larger and older than average, and many have established a comparable bond 
rating. Furthermore, firms that volunteered present value data of pensions prior to 2006 used 
either the 10-year treasury bond yield or Aaa bond-rating for that year. The most difficult portion 
of this calculation involves the computation of X, the annual pension benefit. Companies 
offering executive pensions will typically report defined pension annuities in the form of a 
generic table relating final average earnings with years of credit service. Final average earnings 
reflect the executives’ highest annual average salary and bonus over a specified number of years. 
In this study, we assume that the most recent years’ of executive compensation are also the 
highest.  
To compute the annual pension benefit, we use Equation A2: 
                                                          
1
 Information is taken directly from the FRB archive of historical interest rate data, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm 
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(2) 
Where    refers to the cash salary and bonus compensation to each executive for year t,   refers 
to the number of prior years whose compensation is averaged together, and S refers to the 
executives’ years of service. The years of service figure may relate to date of first hire, years of 
total work experience, or a number of methodologies employed by the firm. This information is 
provided in the same section as the pension plan table. M refers to the multiplicative factor that 
describes the pension plan table, and is best interpreted as the amount of pension benefit earned 
per year of service. For most firms, this figure is between 1.5 and 2.0% of average compensation 
per year of service. The net combination of these two equations produces the actuarial present 
value for the executive pension for that year.
2
 
 
3b. Compensation Leverage and Firm Leverage GAP 
 
Executives, much like individual firms, have a compensation structure that can be expressed 
and compared using leverage. Corporate pensions, as outlined by Feldstein (1982), are a form of 
debt-based compensation, since the firm effectively promises to pay principal and interest (as a 
debtholder) to its executives. Compensating executives with stock awards and option grants are a 
form of equity compensation. Executive compensation leverage, interpreted via the Jensen-
Meckling framework, should be fairly close to the capital structure of the overall firm. 
                                                          
2Some firms will deduct anticipated social security benefits from the annual pension award; since these 
are far smaller than the annual benefits entitled to most executives, no deduction is made here. 
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The acquisition of the pension data provides us with the unique opportunity to study the 
compensation leverage of the individual executives. Following Eisdorfer, Giaccotto, and White 
(2012), the compensation leverage at the firm level is defined as: 
 





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J
j
jjj
J
j
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(3) 
 
where J represents the number of top managers (most frequently five) in each firm in each year. 
We use the procedure developed by Core and Guay (2002) as inputs to the Black-Scholes model 
to determine the value of unexercised stock-options. 
Of particular interest to our research is the dispersion between individual CEOs and the non-
CEO executives that form part of the corporate leadership team. Using this formula, both the 
individual CEO compensation leverage and the compensation leverage of the non-CEO 
executives can be calculated. 
  
3c   Distance-to-Default and CEO Power 
 
 Distance-to-default measures the number of standard deviations in the asset value of a firm 
that would cause the firm to default. This risk metric was established by the Merton-KMV 
framework and described by Sundaram and Yermack (2007). The approximation of this model 
is: 
 
V
DPTV
DtD


  
(4) 
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where Distance-to-Default (DtD) is equal to the firm’s asset market value (V) less the default 
point (DPT) of a firm, divided by the volatility of the firm’s assets (σV). Under the DPT, equity 
holders have a call option to purchase the firms assets; the value of the call is equal to the 
observable equity value. In its current form, the equation is not estimable – two unknowns, V 
and σ, need to be computed first. We know from option theory that equity volatility and asset 
volatility are related as follows: 
 

 
 
 
 
   
(5) 
In this equation, equity volatility (
 
) is observable, E is the market value of equity,    is the 
derivative of the option function with respect to firm value (the delta of the equity holders’ call 
option). Via SAS, these two equations can be solved simultaneously to generate values of V and 
σ, which can be used to generate a value for DtD for each firm-year. Higher values of DtD 
indicate the firm is farther from default, and therefore less risky.  
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that CEOs receiving higher compensation leverage than 
the overall firm leverage increase distance to default by 0.4 standard deviations. Thus, firms that 
provide their chief executives with more pension benefits find that these executives change their 
behavior: they display less appetite for risk than their peers. This perverse incentive may be 
reversed by a strategically setting the compensation mix of non-CEO executives. 
CEOs and executives having similar compensation leverage will also have similar 
management incentives. Arguably, the firm risk effects would be as great (if not compounded) if 
all executives were similarly incentivized. The proposition we explore in this research is that 
non-CEOs with low-leverage compensation mix have no personal incentive in undertaking 
conservative projects. Thus, if the compensation leverage of CEO’s and non-CEO executives 
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were significantly different, these differences should more than likely neutralize the conservative 
risk appetite of a high-leverage CEO. This proposition leads to our first hypothesis:  
H1:  Large differences between the CEO’s compensation leverage and the 
compensation leverage of Non-CEO executives reduces the risk effects 
associated with high compensation leverage 
   
  This is not only an assessment of CEO compensation leverage, but an evaluation of CEO 
power. A highly leveraged CEO wishing to undertake less risky projects would only be able to 
do so if the other executives were similarly compensated. 
 
3d    Rabbi Trusts and the effect of Funding Pensions 
 In this section we examine the role of pre-funding on firm riskiness. In our sample, 24% 
of firms explicitly indicate that pensions are funded via a Rabbi trust. As Bachelder (2002) 
writes, a company choosing to fund a SERP for an executive has a number of regulatory hurdles 
to overcome. Rabbi trusts were developed to help defer the taxability of a corporation or 
individual, and are natural vehicles for funding SERPs. A company can transfer financial assets 
to a rabbi trust for the exclusive benefit of the executive under the condition that the assets 
remain liable to the company’s creditors in a default. If this happens, executives become nothing 
more than general creditors. Nevertheless, we argue that executives with high levels of pension 
and deferred compensation will take comfort knowing that these benefits are pre-funded, and are 
therefore less likely to change their behavior towards risk. This is leads to our second hypothesis:  
H2:  Pre-funding mangers’ pension and deferred compensation via a related Rabbi 
Trust will significantly neutralize the manager’s aversion towards risk. 
   
 In other words, we anticipate that by funding the pension via an interrelated (Rabbi) trust, we 
expect to observe that pension effects on firms’ risk levels will be significantly diminished. In 
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some sense, prefunding a pension via a Rabbi trust does little for the manager: executives of 
bankrupt firms will still liable to creditors in the event of a default. However, since the vast 
majority of pensions offer lump-sum payment options, most will have the opportunity to ‘get 
out’ – comfortably knowing that their pension entitlement has been pre-funded – before 
bankruptcy actually occurs.  
To further expand on this theory, our model also includes substantial governance controls. 
For manager entrenchment, we use both the governance framework established by Gompers et. 
al. (2003) and the entrenchment index established by Bebchuk et. al. (2009). The Gompers 
governance-index (“g-index”) has been used frequently in the literature as a broad indicator of 
firm governance characteristics. The IRRC Corporate Takeover Defense Publication reports 
biannually on 28 variables used to calculate the g-index value (24 of them unique), ranging 
across a wide variety of firm governance provisions. Firms are awarded one point each for these 
24 unique characteristics; the higher the score, the greater the potential agency costs.    IRRC 
was acquired by ISS in 2005, and the following year collection of g-score components ceased, 
limiting our control sample to the years 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. Following precedence in 
Gompers et. al (2003) and Bebchuk et. al. (2009), we assume that the governance characteristics 
provided in the IRRC reports remained constant for each firm until the publication of the 
subsequent report, giving us a nearly complete sample from 2000 until 2006. To access to the 
IRRC data, we use WRDS RiskMetrics, and follow the procedure outlined by Gompers et. al. 
(2003). 
Bebchuk et. al. (2009) introduced the entrenchment index (“e-index”), a subsample 
comprised of 6 of the 24 IRRC Gompers characteristics that were found to be the significant 
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drivers of firm devaluation and abnormal returns
3
. Like the g-index, the e-index awards one point 
for the presence of each governance characteristic and is readily calculable using the WRDS 
RiskMetric database. 
As a robustness check we use an instrumental variable approach. The selection of control 
variables is largely taken from extant literature. In this example, we examine two factors that are 
uniquely attributable to compensation leverage: executive age (which tends to rise as pensions 
rise), and ‘M’, a multiplicative factor that describes the ratio of pension benefits earned per 
dollar of compensation. Firms with higher ‘M’ values allocate more money per dollar to pension 
benefits that those with low ‘M’ values. 
 
4.   Data 
 
We hand-collect a series of executive pension values from 2000 to 2009. The 700 largest 
firms by US market capitalization on December 31, 2009 were examined: of these, 300 offered 
executive pensions (42%), while 290 (41%) provided values calculable with the methodology in 
section 3a. above. We reduced our sample further, omitting firms with impartial or unclear 
compensation data, executive structure, and merging issues related to stock and option data. 
Company financial data are obtained via Compustat, and stock and market values are determined 
through CRSP. 
The resulting dataset covers the period from 2000 thru 2009. It includes 272 firms and 8,965 
executive-year data points, consisting of 2,114 CEOs-years (23.6%) and 6,851 Non-CEO 
executive-years (76.4%). Table I provides a substantial overview of the executive compensation 
                                                          
3
 See Bebchuck et. al. (2002) for a more detailed analysis of governance variables 
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data sample. The average CEO in our sample is 56 years old, and has personal compensation 
leverage of 0.18; non-CEO executives average 53 years in age, and display a personal 
compensation leverage of 0.25. 
Interestingly, the period 2000-2009 supplied some differing conclusions about the affairs of 
executive compensation during a period of variable economic conditions. Table 2 outlines the 
annual salary, bonus, option value, equity award value, and pension value across both CEOs and 
non-CEO executives. The results are surprising: equity and option awards decreased 
substantially in value across the decade, and during the 2008 financial crisis, executive salary 
and bonus values also declined significantly. However, pension values for all executives rose 
continuously over the same period (Figure II), with non-CEO executive pensions increasing in 
value 61% and CEO pensions increasing 138%. It appears that pensions are providing a 
substantial, recession-proof benefit for corporate managers. 
During difficult economic periods, corporations frequently reduce bonus and salary levels. 
Options and stock awards, inherently tied to equity values, will also decline. Pensions, whose 
value is determined by a consistent proportion of several years’ average income, rose unabated. 
Figure 3 demonstrates how economic downturns are associated with higher executive 
compensation leverage. The most substantial increase in compensation leverage was observed 
during the 2008 financial crisis, when leverage values across all executives doubled in a single 
year. The consequence of this change in compensation mix, is that higher leverage is associated 
with less risk-taking behavior; while a conservative attitude towards risk is a necessary 
characteristic in avoiding catastrophes, it is not a strong guarantor of high shareholder returns. 
Table 3 contains many of the firm-level variables we use in later analyses. This table shows 
that firms offering pensions are typically older and well-established, with a strong bias towards 
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manufacturing and utility firms. The average firm in the sample is 90 years old, employs 48.4 
thousand people, and generates $2.8 billion in operating income on $18.1 billion in revenues. 
Dominance of the field by several large firms contributes to the high overall standard deviation 
in financial values; likewise, a low number of firms reporting any R&D expenditure contributes 
to further high variation. Firm leverage across all firm-years averages 0.48, with a median of 
0.33. 
The data also provide a unique insight into the yearly variations in Distance-to-Default 
(DtD). DtD on average is 2.45 for the firm-years sampled but fairly variable; firms in the bottom 
25
th
 percentile report a DtD of 1.53 standard deviations or lower. Across all firms, DtD is highest 
(least risky) during 2005, and lowest in 2008, when an average of 1.27 is reported. Like other 
indicators, its variation coincides with the general economic conditions of the period (see Figure 
I). Overall, the data offer a versatile basis to examine executive pensions and their role in 
executive risk-taking strategy. 
 
5.  Results 
 
The first objective of this section is to verify that our new data sample yield results consistent 
with those found in the existing literature. We also pay particular attention in separating CEOs 
and Non-CEO executives in order to identify their respective firm effects. 
 
5a  Determinants of Executive Inside Debt Holdings 
As indicated in Edmans & Liu (2011), a positive association should be observed between the 
debt-to-equity ratio of a CEO and the firm’s leverage, defined as the ratio of long-term debt over 
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the sum of long-term debt and stockholders’ equity. In the empirical framework, we also 
consider years’ service as an important endogenous factor that is directly related to the size of the 
executive pension. A dummy variable for an executive hired from an outside firm is included to 
examine whether these executives are able to secure superior pension contracts when hired. We 
scale by firm size (using the log of total assets), add a liquidity constraint dummy, indicating 
whether the firm reported negative operating income that year, and add a tax status dummy to 
indicate if a firm reported a tax loss carry-forward. Firms with either a liquidity constraint or a 
tax-loss carry forward are expected to pay lower pensions to their executives. Lastly, we consider 
the age of the firm, and expect that older firms will generally pay more pensions than younger 
firms. Finally, we use year control variables to control for annual fixed effects. This framework 
is similar to that of Sundaram and Yermack (2007). 
We run a Tobit regression using three different (but related) dependent variables: theactuarial 
present value of the executive pension, pension value scaled by executive salary and bonuses, 
and pension value scaled by stock and option award values. By scaling the pension values, we 
can determine the relative importance of debt or equity ownership among executives. Regression 
standard errors are clustered to account for any potential serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
present in the data. 
We divide the data into two subsamples: CEOs and Non-CEO executives. We had expected 
the results would be broadly similar to those found in the existing literature. For the CEO 
subsample (Table 4, Panel A), we find the strongest positive relationship between CEO’s years 
of experience and firm size: larger firms pay more pensions, and CEOs with more experience 
receive greater pensions. Firms with substantial tax loss carry-forwards and negative operating 
income notably pay less in corporate pensions. The strong positive relationship between 
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company leverage and executive leverage is exemplified best when we scale the Pension Value 
by Stock and Option values or use executive compensation leverage as our dependent variable. 
Using Ln(Pension Value), we are looking at the determinants of pension size; Compensation 
Leverage considers the composition of executive compensation. Thus, while firm leverage may 
not dictate absolute size, it is a strong determinant of how important pensions are to the 
compensation package.  
The non-CEO executive subsample (Table 4, Panel B) is notably different then their CEO 
counterparts. Executives hired from outside receive less pensions than those from within the 
firm; likewise, firms with negative operating income and tax loss carry-forwards pay less in 
pensions. Higher firm leverage generates lower absolute pension sizes for non-CEO executives, 
but higher levels of pension relative to other forms of compensation. One reason for this may be 
balancing incentives between a firm CEO and non-CEO executives (see Table 8). When we scale 
pension size by equity compensation or use compensation leverage as proxies, we find positive 
coefficients on our tax status and liquidity constraint dummies. Firms with negative operating 
income, by giving high amounts of pension compensation, are incentivizing the managers to 
preserve the long-term survival of the firm. We believe this to be a rational response to periods 
of uncertainty in the firm, and potentially a reaction to higher levels of market-wide volatility.  
Several conclusions can be drawn as to the nature of the differences between our findings 
and those of Sundaram and Yermack. Executives were hired from an outside institution had a 
broadly negative effect on their pension payments. There is some reason for why this is: newly 
promoted executives are less frequently given pensions as a form of compensation.  Despite the 
substantial growth of pension values, many firms have discontinued them altogether; still more 
firms limit which executives are eligible for a pension, despite its ability to attract executive 
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talent. The rate of pension abandonment is still fairly insignificant, and it is likely that pensions 
will play an important role in executive compensation in the foreseeable future. 
Firm age is not a driving factor in these regressions. Most of these firms are fairly old, and 
differences between the oldest firm (233 years old) and youngest (some under 10 years old) may 
no longer be significant. Offering a substantial pension scheme may be an important way for new 
or startup firms to attract and keep executive talent, especially considering the size of the firms.  
 
5b Executive Turnover 
The second portion of our Sundaram and Yermack comparison considers executive 
turnover and pensions. CEO’s and non-CEOs alike can turnover for a variety of reasons; in this 
study, we follow the lead of prior research and divide them into two categories: forced turnover, 
and planned turnover.  
Table 5 offers the logit estimates of all executives, where the dependent variable is equal 
to one if the executive leaves in the prior fiscal year. Turnover data is provided via Execucomp. 
The first primary explanatory variable, ‘Pension start age indicator’, equals 1 if he is within one-
year of earning his full pension entitlement. The ‘Pension past payable indicator’ equals 1 if the 
executive has passed the age at which a full payout can occur. Scaling the pension start age 
indicator by 65 and the pension past payable indicator by ages within one year of 65 considers if 
an executive is on the cusp of retirement, where significant planned turnover occurs.  
Other control variables include the excess stock returns over the last two years, a net-of-market 
company performance measure; CEO ownership, executive experience, age dummy variables, 
and year dummy variables. We then split the results into CEOs only (Table 6, Panel A) and non-
CEO executives only (Table 6, Panel B).  
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Based on prior research, we expected that forced turnover was driven by poor stock 
returns, and planned turnover by pension start age and whether it was already payable (in other 
words, avoiding ‘early retirement’. For all executives, forced turnover was determined largely by 
the executives’ percentage ownership, which was substantially robust to correction: executives 
(specifically non-CEO) with low ownership stakes in the company were more likely to be 
sacked.  Planned turnover, on the other hand, was positively correlated to executive ownership in 
a firm, as was being at starting age or past the earliest age to receive a full executive pension. 
Excess stock return was present as a minor effect (lower stock returns) with no significance in 
both forced and planned turnover events.  
Considering only CEO’s, forced turnover was determined unexpectedly by being close or 
beyond the pension age, what would normally be expected of planned turnover. One reason for 
this was the preponderance of forced turnover CEOs who were at or ‘older’ than retirement age; 
when this occurs, the existing methodology will have more trouble defining the causality of the 
turnover. Planned turnover was expectedly determined largely by being near or after the pension 
start age and years of experience. No evidence was found linking substantial negative stock 
returns with forced turnover during the sample period. Forced turnover for non-CEO executives 
was determined largely by ownership – those without substantial ownership in the firm were 
much more likely to be fired. For planned turnover events, the findings sufficiently matched 
expectations: executives retired voluntarily when near the pensionable age.  
Overall, several important findings were made by this analysis. First, this is the first study 
to consider non-CEO executive pension effects and turnover; unlike CEOs, these executives are 
most frequently forced out of a firm when they hold a comparatively low ownership stake. 
Second, excess stock returns were not an important driver of executive turnover between 2000 
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and 2009. High stock volatility in the sample period could account for the weaker than expected 
correlation between stock returns and turnover, as could the broader macroeconomic climate.  
 
5c Default Risk as a Function of Executive’s Inside Debt 
As Merton (1974) demonstrated theoretically, a manager with a lower debt-to-equity ratio 
than his firm has an incentive to increase risk. This would inadvertently create a substantial 
agency cost, as the manger would seek to undertake projects whose riskiness exceeded what the 
firm’s capital structure could reasonably support. Extending this to all executives, we examine 
whether the inside debt holdings of such manager contributes to the firm’s overall riskiness using 
the definition of distance-to-default.  
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that distance-to-default is approximately 0.4 
standard deviations higher when the ratio of the CEO’s debt-to-equity is greater than the 
company’s ratio. Setting distance-to-default as the dependent variable, we provide firm size (log 
of total assets), leverage (log of debt/equity), executive age, and year indicator variables as 
control variables. We further include the log of (Executive pension value/Executive stock and 
option value) to create a normalized continuous leverage variable, and maintain an indicator 
variable for the executive’s debt-to-equity measure equal to 1 if the executive’s pension/equity 
ratio is higher than the firm’s debt/equity ratio.  
In Table 7, Panel A, we present the CEO-only estimates for default risk. In the estimate 
for the center column, we find that when the CEO’s debt-to-equity level is higher than their firm, 
the firm is significantly less risky. When the continuous leverage variable is also included (right 
column), only the continuous leverage variable is significant; a unit increase in this ratio implies 
a decrease in risk of nearly 0.1 standard deviations when compensating for the logged values. An 
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additional variable not controlled for in prior research, CEO age, was also included, and had 
significance just below the 10% level.  Panel B considers the non-CEO executive component of 
this analysis. We find that, like CEOs, higher levels of executive leverage correspond to greater 
distance-to-default for the firm. The significance and magnitude were comparable to those of the 
CEO’s, and we find that firm size and leverage have little explanatory effect on individual firms’ 
distance-to-default.  
 
5d Default Risk and Executive Power 
The comparable results between CEOs and non-CEO executives in the last section 
suggests collinearity, or in the very least, redundancy. One way to examine the difference 
between executive and CEO pensions is to focus on the ‘leverage gap’ – the difference in 
compensation leverage between CEOs and non-CEO executives. Firms with the smallest 
absolute value leverage gap are the most in agreement: the CEOs and non-CEO executives are 
compensated approximately equally. We predicted that such firms would have the lowest risk of 
default.  
In our data, we began with two observations for each firm year: the compensation 
leverage of the CEO, and the consolidated compensation leverage of all other executives (Table 
8). The difference between these two numbers generated our ‘leverage gap’. Using distance-to-
default as the dependent variable, we included firm size, leverage, and the log of CEO 
ownership, CEO age, and year indicator variables as dependent variables. We also controlled for 
CEO leverage to provide a direct link observation between increases and CEO leverage and 
changes in firm risk. 
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The sample consisted of 4,119 firm-year observations for the leverage gap, which we 
sorted by absolute value into equal thirds. The lowest absolute value leverage gap firm years 
(center left column) demonstrated that for every unit increase in CEO leverage, these firms 
generated almost one full standard deviation increase in distance-to-default (when adjusting for 
logs). The middle-third of firms demonstrated a similar risk-shifting effect, but the highest-third 
of firms (the greatest difference in executive and CEO leverage) provided no such relationship at 
all. We find that higher firm leverage corresponded to lower distance-to-default, a finding that 
was eliminated when we control for fixed effects in Table 10. High levels of executive 
ownership among executives with the lowest amount of compensation differences was 
negatively correlated with distance-to-default, suggesting that in these firms, high amounts of 
executive equity ownership made these firms riskier.  
Thus, the agency effect is most prevalent in firms where CEOs and non-CEO executives 
are compensated with a similar debt and equity mixture. Yet the non-CEO executives do have a 
tangible effect on firm risk; when CEO’s and non-CEO executives have vastly different leverage 
levels, the ability for a CEO with a higher compensation leverage to behave more conservatively 
is completely neutralized. The different composition of executives’ compensation between the 
CEO and non-CEOs prevents either group from effectively pursuing their risk-shifting 
incentives, and reduces these agency effects significantly. 
 
5e Rabbi Trusts and Pension Funding 
 To test whether funding pensions via a Rabbi Trust have an effect on firm risk, we apply 
an instrumental variable 2SLS model using two governance metrics: the 24-variable Gompers 
Index model and the 6-variable entrenchment model. Our results were surprisingly significant: 
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after breaking the sample into two categories, funded and unfunded pensions, we find that 
funded pensions completely eliminate the conservative agency effects of high compensation 
leverage. By prefunding their pension assets in trust, executives appear reasonably confident in 
keeping their pensions that their risk effects on the firm are completely neutralized. Our results 
are presented in Table 9.  
 To proxy for pension levels, we use industry-adjusted manager leverage; higher values 
corresponded to a 0.871 standard-deviation increase in distance-to-default under the Gompers 
Model and a 1.0565 standard-deviation increase in the Entrenchment Model. This effect was 
completely diminished when considering the subsample of funded pensions: the results were 
insignificant and slightly negative on both accounts. In line with governance theory, we found 
that firms with higher Gompers and entrenchment were generally riskier. Apart from leverage, 
other firm effects were effectively neutral in the unfunded model. When we consider funded 
pensions, we find that in lieu of the diminished importance of compensation leverage, other 
factors become more significant in the determination of firm risk: CEO ownership, salary and 
bonus levels, and firm size were all significant. Interestingly, we also find that options value was 
not a significant driver of firm distance-to-default in either funded or unfunded pensions.  
 The implications of this finding are significant. Firms conscious of the agency costs of 
high pension levels can substantially reduce this risk by choosing to fund their pensions. 
Executives will be satiated knowing their pension entitlement is available whenever they elect 
(or are required) to retire; as such, they will spend significantly less effort concentrating on the 
long-term viability of the firm and the safety of their assets. However, most pensions aren’t 
payable in full until a minimum retirement age is met. This may indicate that managers are either 
confident in their ability to maintain a position in their company until retirement, enabling them 
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to achieve their full pension entitlement; or, it may indicate that they feel they can negotiate 
some kind of structured pension settlement from the company in the event of a forced retirement.  
 
5f Robustness 
To test whether the Leverage GAP and Default Risk relationship holds, we employ a 
fixed effects model (Table 10) that confirms our findings in Section 5d and use the Gompers 
Index for governance controls explained in the last section. We observe that when we control for 
company fixed effects, firms with both high CEO and high non-CEO executive leverage 
contribute approximately 1.25 standard-deviations to our distance-to-default measure, an 
incredibly significant risk-shifting effect. This effect is reduces considerably for the middle third 
of firms in our sample (center column), and becomes a negative effect for the firms reporting the 
highest differences. Rather than completely neutralizing these effects, the robust model finds that 
firms with the greatest disagreement in compensation structure between CEO and non-CEO 
executives are actually become ever riskier. Based on our results, we find that the Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007) data was driven by a few firms who opted to award CEOs and non-CEOs alike 
with generous pension compensation packages. When these values were even moderately 
different, the significant risk-shifting tendencies of these managers was significantly reduced.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our paper accomplishes three things: we introduced a unique, hand-collected executive 
pension dataset to significant analysis and compared CEO and non-CEO pensions using the 
Sundaram and Yermack framework; we found that the risk level of firm is significantly 
dependent on the difference in payment structure between CEOs and non-CEO executives; 
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thirdly, we observed that funding pensions can significantly reduce the risk-shifting agency costs 
associated with pension compensation. Most importantly, we find that non-CEO executive 
pensions matter.   
We provide evidence for two observations which can improve the way firms handle 
executive contacts in regard to agency costs. When CEO and non-CEO executive compensation 
leverage is in agreement, high leverage across the executive board amplifies the conservative 
effects of agency theory. When compensation leverage is substantially different, we no longer 
observe the risk-reducing conservatism found in high-leverage CEOs. If executives steer a firm 
based on personal incentives, differing their compensation structure defocuses them.  Second, 
funding pensions generates significant confidence in the manager to achieve their pension 
entitlement and neutralizes the conservative tendencies of the high compensation leverage 
manager. Firms can employ this information to create contracts that best suit their firms’ goals; 
to counter risk aversion, the contracts between CEOs and executives can either be different, or 
the firm can opt to fund them via a Rabbi Trust. Inversely, many firms may find these risk-
shifting effects a desirable reaction to higher levels of market volatility. The 2008 financial crisis 
and the particularly underperforming equity market of the sample period (2000-2009) likely 
encouraged many firms to support these risk-shifting incentives as a means to ensure firm 
survival.  
Additional questions remain for further consideration. What is the effect on the leverage 
gap differences in firm performance? Some research, namely Bebchuck and Fried (2004), 
question whether pensions really are a form of debt compensation at all. They note that SERP 
contracts can be negotiated to supersede other debt holders in the event of bankruptcy, removing 
their incentives to be particularly conservative. Secondly, numerous endogenous variables exist 
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that are beyond our current capacity as a field to effectively model. It would be interesting to find 
out how these results compared to different risk model paradigms, and how pensions have 
evolved in the context of their frequently industry-specific compensation roles in future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Appendix 
Calculating an Executive Pension 
Using ConocoPhillips as an example firm, we can establish how the pension computation 
is performed for each executive. In this case, James J. Mulva, the President and CEO of 
ConocoPhillips in 2002, provides the example representation.  
In Table A1, we have produced the same pension table disclosure available to investors 
of ConocoPhillips in fiscal year 2002. While investors may reference annual reports to access 
these tables, they are presented more conveniently in Definitive 14A statements. The table 
records years of service in five-year increments on the horizontal axis, and final average earnings 
in $500,000 increments on the vertical axis. Final average earnings are defined as the average of 
the three highest years of salary and bonus awards in the ten years prior to retirement. We 
assume the most recent three years of Mr. Mulva’s compensation are his three highest years of 
compensation in the last ten years, yielding a three-year average of $4.487 million in earnings 
credited towards retirement.  
For each executive firm-year, a sufficient historical salary and bonus level of each 
executive was computed. To begin the sample at 2000, firms requiring three years of historical 
compensation needed SEC data beginning in 1998, and for firms requiring five years, 1996 was 
the first year of hand-collection. For many executives, especially those requiring five or more 
years of averaged compensation to compute their earnings, historical data was unavailable for as 
much time as was needed. To compute average compensation for these executives, salaries and 
bonuses were ‘downwardly weighted’ to the oldest year. For example, if five years of data was 
required to average an executive’s compensation and four years were available, the most recent 
three years were waited equally and the most distant year double-weighted to generate a five-
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year proxy. Mr. Mulva’s widely-available birth year of 1946 establishes his age at the end of 
2002 at 56; for other executives, age information was obtained from 10-Ks (when available), and 
using a variety of other sources including old news articles, obituaries, and public records 
indexing services. Retirement age to achieve full benefit is 65.  
The multiplicative factor M can be determined algebraically from Table A1: the addition 
of every $1,000,000 in final average earnings generates $320,000 of additional pension 
compensation for 20 years of service; this corresponds to 0.32 for 20 years or 0.016 (1.6%) of 
final average earnings for each year of service. Mulva, as of 2002, has 31 years of service credit 
towards retirement. 
Table A1 
Pension Plan Disclosure for ConocoPhillips, FY 2002 
The pension benefit table is taken directly from the FY 2002 DEF-14A statement filed by ConocoPhillips on April 4, 2003, p.24. 
 Years of Credited Service at Normal Retirement 
Final 
Average 
Earnings 
20 25 30 35 40 
 750,000  240,000 300,000 360,000 420,000 480,000 
1,250,000  400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 800,000 
1,750,000  560,000 700,000 840,000 980,000 1,120,000 
2,250,000  720,000 900,000 1,080,000 1,260,000 1,440,000 
2,750,000  880,000 1,100,000 1,320,000 1,540,000 1,760,000 
3,250,000  1,040,000 1,300,000 1,560,000 1,820,000 2,080,000 
3,750,000  1,200,000 1,500,000 1,800,000 2,100,000 2,400,000 
4,250,000  1,360,000 1,700,000 2,040,000 2,380,000 2,720,000 
4,750,000  1,520,000 1,900,000 2,280,000 2,660,000 3,040,000 
5,250,000  1,680,000 2,100,000 2,520,000 2,940,000 3,360,000 
5,750,000  1,840,000 2,300,000 2,760,000 3,220,000 3,680,000 
6,250,000  2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 4,000,000 
6,750,000  2,160,000 2,700,000 3,240,000 3,780,000 4,320,000 
7,250,000  2,320,000 2,900,000 3,480,000 4,060,000 4,640,000 
7,750,000  2,480,000 3,100,000 3,720,000 4,340,000 4,960,000 
The Pension Plan Table section of the Definitive 14A provides the following information: “The Pension Plan Table below shows the maximum 
estimated straight-life annual benefits payable at age 65 for the final average earnings indicated, prior to reductions required by the companies’ 
plans for Social Security benefits. The current years of service, as of December 31, 2002 for the Named Executive Officers for retirement benefit 
purposes are: Mr. Mulva, 31 years; Mr. Dunham, 36 years; Mr. McKee, 35 years; Mr. Nokes, 32 years; and Mr. Harrington, 23 years.” 
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We can assume that Mulva will work through his 65
th
 year, at which point he will retire with 40 
years of service
4
. Following Equation A2, we can calculate his annual pension entitlement 
credited upon retirement as 0.016 x 40 x $4.487= $2.872 million.  
To complete equation A1, we require Mulva’s age, A (56); R, the company’s retirement 
age (65); d, the cost of long-term debt; and p(n), the probability that Mulva will be alive and 
receiving pension disbursements n years into the future. The cost of long term debt, determined 
from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H15 for Moody’s Aaa rated bonds was d=0.0649 for 
2002. Using the statistical tables provided by the U.S. Social Security Administration, we can 
infer that Mulva has an 88.3% chance of being alive to receive his first payment at the age of 66, 
86.7% chance of surviving until age 67, and so forth until age 120
5
. The summation of each 
year’s actuarial present value contribution establishes our present value of Mulva’s pension 
benefit at the end of 2002: $13.673 million.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Mr. Mulva was 56 with 31 years of service in 2002; he was eligible to achieve full retirement benefits in 2011, at 
which point he would have had 40 years of service (31+(65-56)).  
5
 The odds of Mulva surviving even to age 111 are so minimal, that no additional present value is added beyond 
this age. Thus, the age 120 truncation is appropriate based on current longevity estimates.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics for executive data 
This table uses data from 272 firms derived from a base sample of 300 firms selected of 
the 700 largest companies by market capitalization. Salary and Bonus values were hand-
collected; option and stock awards were calculated based on the options grants in that 
particular sample year for each executive and computed using the methodology explained 
in the text. Pension values represent their actuarial present values for each executive firm-
year.  
 
All 
Executives CEOs 
Non-CEO 
Executives 
Sample Size 8,955 2,104 6,851 
Average Age 53.81 56.26 52.93 
Compensation Leverage 0.24 0.18 0.25 
Compensation 
   Salary (in Thousands) 
       Mean 613.99 908.06 524.46 
    SD 357.99 458.85 262.22 
    25th Percentile 400.00 640.05 383.37 
    Median 533.92 948.48 493.72 
    75th Percentile 773.44 1118.00 630.51 
Bonus (in Thousands) 
       Mean 583.96 930.52 478.51 
    SD 1459.95 1573.69 1406.84 
    25th Percentile 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    Median 210.00 365.00 194.98 
    75th Percentile 630.00 1281.00 539.72 
Option Awards (in Thousands) 
    Mean 12686.93 31333.21 6960.49 
    SD 34725.44 59598.16 18605.87 
    25th Percentile 927.09 3213.30 734.34 
    Median 3492.77 11638.07 2593.31 
    75th Percentile 10835.22 33881.62 7275.68 
Stock Awards (in Thousands) 
       Mean 28497.81 93711.35 8470.18 
    SD 250079.10 505605.82 39482.40 
    25th Percentile 1216.90 4592.29 962.73 
    Median 3383.85 12742.20 2482.11 
    75th Percentile 9805.82 35419.82 5939.71 
Pension Value (in Thousands) 
       Mean 3712.41 7453.28 2575.98 
    SD 5948.77 9249.56 3822.98 
    25th Percentile 720.54 1696.08 618.92 
    Median 1817.08 4339.27 1479.80 
    75th Percentile 4137.63 9543.79 3078.12 
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Table 2: Executive Compensation and Leverage by Year, 2000-2009  
This table uses data from 272 firms derived from a base sample of 300 firms selected of the 700 largest companies 
by market capitalization. The graph uses 8,955 hand-collected executive salary, bonus, and pension data over the 
sample period 2000-2009, consisting of 2,104 CEO and 6,851 non-CEO executive data points. Sample reflects raw 
value of salary and bonuses; pensions are calculated based on their actuarial present value during that year. Option 
values were also tabulated. 
All Executives 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Salary 555.43 573.28 574.62 608.06 617.97 643.34 659.06 671.63 694.99 491.01 
Bonus 820.14 623.48 714.15 818.68 937.28 1157.18 235.28 344.18 186.07 229.83 
Option 18810.29 13348.77 7307.10 10142.2 11286.02 15533.24 21966.51 19827.69 4074.19 4940.3 
Stock 35226.29 28184.08 21314.58 21055.6 36850.17 33835.90 28563.86 37743.41 21065.40 21155 
Pension 2557.08 2682.64 2773.11 3421.82 3687.90 4039.36 4173.66 4189.34 4359.04 4744.6 
Leverage 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.34 0.32 
CEOs Only 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Salary 824.62 835.62 839.05 895.03 898.92 925.63 1006.04 1010.19 1064.09 699.13 
Bonus 1195.52 988.58 1039.91 1368.77 1553.31 1747.92 413.78 437.52 257.97 396.05 
Option 40864.33 32301.97 15260.61 23552.7 27478.42 36976.33 57361.80 53147.36 11506.35 12762 
Stock 113546.1 91568.65 68775.04 64282.4 124673.6 111300.7 86319.09 129413.0 73274.28 67974 
Pension 4446.16 4934.57 4699.65 6370.87 6402.26 7442.74 9159.65 9470.27 10295.65 10619 
Leverage 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.29 0.27 
Non-CEO Executives 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Salary 468.82 492.49 488.77 519.19 524.94 548.12 555.77 574.59 592.43 435.01 
Bonus 699.37 511.05 608.38 648.33 733.30 957.92 182.14 317.42 166.09 185.36 
Option 11787.71 7401.49 4721.28 5944.12 5904.50 8341.76 11408.26 10151.62 1983.32 2789.5 
Stock 10287.25 8294.79 5884.45 7523.72 7662.16 7856.13 11335.73 11122.48 6377.64 8281.6 
Pension 1962.85 1980.35 2151.03 2508.48 2794.62 2912.23 2687.67 2676.61 2706.10 3164.4 
Leverage 0.21 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.35 0.34 
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Table 3: Firm Level Pension Variables, 272 Firms 
This figure uses data from 272 firms derived from a base sample of 300 firms selected of the 700 largest companies 
by market capitalization. The sample statistics use 8,955 hand-collected executive salary, bonus, and pension data 
over the sample period 2000-2009. Firm age references the numbers of years since the firms’ founding; retirement 
Distance-to-default was calculated via the Moody’s KMV framework explained in the text; retirement age and 
pension calculation months are firm-specific and collected from their financial statements. Firm Age refers to the 
age of the firm as reported via Compustat; Firm Size is the log of the Firm Market Capitalization is the end of year 
firm stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding; Revenues, EBITDA, Operating Income, R&D 
expenditure, Total Assets, Debt and Equity were derived directly from Compustat. Firm leverage is defined as the 
total debt divided by the total asset size.   
 
Mean St. Dev 
25
th
 
Percentile Median 
75
th
 
Percentile 
Firm Age (years) 90.30 48.12 54 93 120 
Retirement Age 64.26 2.06 65 65 65 
Months Used in Pension Calculation 50.08 15.48 36 60 60 
Log (Firm Size) 4.16 0.71 3.70 4.16 4.55 
Distance-to-Default 2.45 1.27 1.53 2.23 3.15 
Income Statement Items 
Revenues 18080.81 28092.12 4410.09 8954.29 18794.58 
EBITDA 3649.63 7196.63 763.12 1634.28 3395.50 
Operating Income 2778.49 6199.98 545.18 1172.30 2531.50 
R&D Expenditure 21.14 207.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Balance Sheet Items 
Total Assets 56756.63 173201.33 5105.16 14557.90 36017.73 
Current Debt 8137.30 44312.81 89.84 384.18 1360.00 
Long Term Debt 8918.64 27199.45 957.84 2769.31 6751.75 
Equity 13532.96 25405.82 2220.23 6129.36 14851.75 
Market Value of Equity Shares 24419.95 42605.85 5311.66 10648.00 22760.56 
Other Firm Variables 
Firm Leverage 0.48 0.92 0.20 0.33 0.56 
Employees (Thousands) 48.38 65.57 10.80 25.83 52.55 
Tax Loss Carry Forward (proportion) 0.317 
    Negative Operating Income (proportion) 0.023         
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Figure 1: Distance-to-Default of Sample Companies, 2000-2008 
The variable is dtd, distance-to-default, calculated via the Moody’s KMV framework explained in the text, and 
analyzed over 272 firms derived from a base sample of 300 firms selected of the 700 largest companies by market 
capitalization, 2009. Larger values indicate that a firm is farther from default; smaller numbers indicate increasing 
closeness to potential default of ‘0’, which occurs when a firm’s asset value drops below the value of its short term 
plus half of its long term debt.  
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Figure 2: CEO and Non-CEO Executive Compensation, 2000-2009 
This figure uses data from 272 firms derived from a base sample of 300 firms selected of the 700 largest companies 
by market capitalization. The graph uses 8,955 hand-collected executive salary, bonus, and pension data over the 
sample period 2000-2009. Sample reflects raw value of salary and bonuses; pensions are calculated based on their 
actuarial present value during that year. Option values were tabulated but are not included here for scaling purposes.  
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Figure 3: Compensation Leverage for All Executives, 2000-2009 
Compensation Leverage as defined as [(Pension Value) / (Stock Award Value + Option Value + Pension Value). 
Gray areas indicate recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: March-November 2001 
and December 2007 to June 2009. Data points are graphed to represent fiscal-year end data: thus, '2000' should be 
interpreted here as typically December 31, 2000.  
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Table 4: Determinants of Inside Debt Holdings 
This table presents the determinants of executive inside debt holdings using three dependent variables: pension 
value (raw), pension value scaled by salary and bonus levels, and pension value scaled by stock and option values 
for all executives. Dependent variables include ‘Years Experience of Executive’, the duration of tenure of the 
executive as recorded via the company’s financial statement; ‘Firm Size’, the log of the total assets of the firm at 
year end; ‘ Leverage’, the log of total firm debt divided by total asset size; Liquidity Constant and Tax dummy 
variables representing whether the firm reported a negative income or a net operating loss carryover during that 
firm year; ‘Growth Opportunities’, the log of firm R&D expenditure scaled by total sales; and ‘Firm age’, the age 
of the firm since its founding. The sample represents data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009 and includes 
robust standard errors.  
Panel A: CEOs 
Dependent Variable Ln(Pension Value) 
Ln (Pension Value 
÷ (Salary + Bonus) 
Ln(Pension Value ÷ 
(Stock + Options) 
Compensation 
Leverage 
 Years Experience of 
Executive 
0.0305*** 0.0263*** 0.0291*** 0.0017*** 
(8.16) (6.92) (6.30) (3.56) 
Hired from Outside Dummy -0.5543 -0.2596 -0.4566 -0.0004 
(-1.26) (-0.63) (-0.77) (-0.01) 
Firm Size (log of total assets) 0.4355*** 0.0959 -0.1511 -0.0017 
(5.04) (1.14) (-1.40) (0.17) 
Leverage (log of debt/assets) -0.1641 -0.1999 0.7044*** 0.0919*** 
(-1.18) (-1.37) (4.08) (5.64) 
Liquidity Constraint Dummy  
(negative operating income) 
-0.8924*** -0.5670* 0.0680 0.0534 
(-3.08) (-1.69) (0.13) (1.07) 
Growth Opportunities  
(log of R&D/sales) 
0.0247 -0.0466 0.0779 0.0021*** 
(0.38) (-0.47) (0.79) (0.25) 
Tax Status (carry-forward 
dummy) 
-0.0986 0.0859 0.1903* 0.0322*** 
(-1.15) (1.30) (1.86) (2.91) 
Firm age 0.0013 0.0001 0.0011 0.0002 
(1.41) (-0.05) (0.98) (1.28) 
Panel B: Non-CEO Executives 
Years Experience of 
Executive 
0.0304*** 0.0262*** 0.0239*** 0.0020*** 
(16.93) (13.99) (9.28) (6.52) 
Hired from Outside Dummy -0.4280** -0.5201** -0.8214*** -0.0836*** 
(-2.38) (-2.51) (-3.69) (-3.19) 
Firm Size (log of total assets) 0.3863*** -0.06370 -0.3252*** -0.019*** 
(8.91) (-1.35) (-5.46) (-3.28) 
Leverage (log of debt/assets) -0.1161* -0.1497** 0.3751*** 0.1022*** 
(-1.81) (-2.34) (4.07) (9.87) 
Liquidity Constraint Dummy  
(negative operating income) 
-0.1814 0.1457 0.7553** 0.1735*** 
(-1.22) (0.82) (2.06) (3.49) 
Growth Opportunities  
(log of R&D/sales) 
-0.0512 -0.0484 0.0528 0.0002 
(-1.62) (-1.62) (1.16) (0.03) 
Tax Status (carry-forward 
dummy) 
-0.0683 0.0631 0.1791*** 0.0242*** 
(-1.58) (1.51) (3.08) (2.89) 
Years since founding of firm 
0.0006 -0.0002 0.0013* -0.0003*** 
(1.35) (-0.54) (-2.20) (-3.17) 
‘*’ Significant at 10% Level; ‘**’ Significant at the 5% Level, ‘***’ Significant at the 1% Level 
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Table 5: Logit Estimates for All Executives 
This table presents the logistic regression (logit) estimates for the probability of executive turnover. The dependent 
variable equals 1 if the CEO leaves his position during the fiscal year. The pension start age indicator equals 1 if the 
executive’s reported age is within 1 year of the age where the executive can obtain full payout of his pension 
entitlement. The pension past payable indicator equals 1 if the executive’s age exceeds by more than 1 year the age 
at which he had the initial right to immediate payout. Excess stock return was calculated as the different between the 
continuously compounded raw stock return and the CRSP value-weighted index. We also control for ‘Executive 
percentage ownership’, the relative total equity holdings of the executive in relation to the firm’s market 
capitalization; and ‘Years Experience of Executive’, the duration of tenure of the executive as recorded via the 
company’s financial statement; year variables to control for the time period of the sample; and CEO age dummy 
variables for all sample ages of the executives, ranging from 32 to 89.  The sample contains 3,915 and 3,840 firm-
years representing data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009. 
All Executives All Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Planned 
Turnover 
Planned 
Turnover 
Pension start age indicator 0.9223*** -0.6550 1.1164*** 0.7620 
 
(3.09) (-0.63) (3.50) (1.47) 
Pension start age indicator x  
indicator for start age = 65    
-0.796 
   
(-0.88) 
Pension past payable indicator 0.3100 -0.1349 0.4380 0.5411 
 
(1.10) (-0.28) (1.33) (1.54) 
Pension past payable indicator x 
 indicator for CEO age 64,65, or 66    
0.7731 
   
(1.17) 
Log( Excess stock return, prior 2 years) -0.1893 0.0309 -0.2844 -0.2960 
 
(-1.37) (0.26) (-1.58) (-1.64) 
Log(Executive percentage ownership) 0.0658* -0.1612*** 0.1542*** 0.1529**** 
 
(1.71) (-2.76) (3.52) (3.49) 
Years Experience of Executive 0.0658** -0.0024 0.0149*** 0.0145** 
 
(2.20) (-0.30) (2.54) (2.47) 
Observations 2840 2840 2840 2840 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
‘*’ Significant at 10% Level; ‘**’ Significant at the 5% Level, ‘***’ Significant at the 1% Level 
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Table 6: Regressions of Inside Debt Holdings, CEOs and Executives 
This table presents the logistic regression (logit) estimates for the probability of executive turnover. The dependent 
variable equals 1 if the CEO leaves his position during the fiscal year. The pension start age indicator equals 1 if the 
executive’s reported age is within 1 year of the age where the executive can obtain full payout of his pension 
entitlement. The pension past payable indicator equals 1 if the executive’s age exceeds by more than 1 year the age 
at which he had the initial right to immediate payout. Excess stock return was calculated as the different between 
the continuously compounded raw stock return and the CRSP value-weighted index. We also control for ‘Executive 
percentage ownership’, the relative total equity holdings of the executive in relation to the firm’s market 
capitalization; and ‘Years Experience of Executive’, the duration of tenure of the executive as recorded via the 
company’s financial statement; year variables to control for the time period of the sample; and CEO age dummy 
variables for all sample ages of the executives, ranging from 32 to 89.  The sample contains represents data on 272 
firms over the period 2000-2009. 
CEOs Only 
 All Turnover 
Forced 
Turnover 
Planned 
Turnover 
Planned 
Turnover 
Pension start age indicator 0.1417 1.215** 0.989 0.6301 
 
(0.20) (2.37) (0.68) (0.78) 
Pension start age indicator x  
indicator for start age = 65    
-0.1300 
   
(0.13) 
Pension past payable indicator 1.263*** 1.081** 1.157* 1.263** 
 
(2.93) (0.23) (1.91) (2.04) 
Log( Excess stock return, prior 2 years) -0.5289 -0.498 -0.8953 -0.8811 
 
(-1.20) (-1.52) (-1.59) (1.58) 
Log(CEO percentage ownership) -0.0010 -0.944 0.1376 0.1305 
 
(-0.01) (0.70) (1.28) (1.22) 
Years Experience of Executive 0.0196 0.0355 0.0251 0.0255 
 
(1.60) (0.009) (1.41) (1.42) 
Observations 621 603 565 563 
Non-CEO Executives 
Pension start age indicator 1.115*** -0.1061 1.2271*** 1.2419*** 
 (3.41) (-0.10) (3.53) (3.41) 
Pension start age indicator x  
indicator for start age = 65 
   -0.0871 
   (-0.10) 
Pension past payable indicator -0.0801 -1.389 0.2322 0.2500 
 (-0.21) (-1.52) (0.58) (0.58) 
Log( Excess stock return, prior 2 years) -0.1488 -0.0313 -0.2194 -0.2193 
 (-1.20) (0.26) (-1.31) (-1.31) 
Log(Executive percentage ownership) -0.0832* -0.1550** 0.1578*** 0.1580*** 
 (1.93) (2.17) (3.35) (3.36) 
Years Experience of Executive 0.0095* -0.0084* 0.0142** 0.0142** 
 (1.75) (-0.82) (2.31) (2.31) 
Observations 2219 2023 2219 2219 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
‘*’ Significant at 10% Level; ‘**’ Significant at the 5% Level, ‘***’ Significant at the 1% Level 
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Table 7: Regressions of Default Risk as a Function of CEO’s Inside Debt and Equity 
Holdings 
The dependent variable is dtd, distance-to-default, calculated via the Moody’s KMV framework explained in the 
text. Independent variables are ‘Firm Size’, the natural log of the total assets of the firm at year end; ‘Firm 
Leverage’, total firm debt divided by the book value of equity;  ‘CEO Leverage’, reflecting the CEO specific 
compensation leverage; ‘Log (Executive Leverage)’, reflecting the compensation leverage of non-CEO 
executives; ‘ Indicator for CEO's pension/equity> firm's debt/equity’, an indicator variable indicating whether 
executive leverage was higher than firm leverage; ‘CEO Age’ and ’Executive Age’ indicating the age of the 
executive when the data is reported; and year variables to control for year effects. Omitted from the table but 
included in the regression were additional firm-level control variables such for tax carry-forward status, excess 
stock returns, executive ownership, and liquidity constraints. The sample contains 2,815 firm-years representing 
data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009. 
CEO Variables Only 
Dependent Variable: Distance-to-Default Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Firm Size (log of total assets) 0.0110 0.0233 0.0108 
(0.22) (0.45) (0.21) 
Log(Firm Leverage (book value)) -0.0414 0.0116 -0.0393 
(-1.29) (0.32) (-1.01) 
Log(CEO leverage) 0.0858*** 
 
0.0848*** 
(4.40) 
 
(3.81) 
Indicator for CEO's pension/equity> firm's debt/equity 
 
0.1699** 0.0094 
 
(2.16) (0.10) 
CEO Age 0.0062 0.0072 0.0061 
 (1.34) (1.58) (1.33) 
Year Indicator Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Total Observations  2815 2815 2815 
R^2 0.383 0.385 0.383 
Non-CEO Executives Only 
Firm Size (log of total assets) -0.0525 -0.0432 -0.0533 
 (-0.99) (-0.80) (-1.00) 
Log(Firm Leverage (book value)) -0.0412 0.0179 -0.0315 
 (-1.12) (0.44) (-0.72) 
Log(Executive Leverage) 0.0832***  0.0786*** 
 (4.07)  (3.36) 
Indicator for Executives’ pension/equity> firm's debt/equity  0.1958 0.0423 
  (2.35) (0.44) 
Executive Age 0.0043 0.0044 0.0043 
 (0.90) (0.92) (0.89) 
Year Indicator Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Total Observations 2815 2815 2815 
R^2 0.395 0.389 0.395 
‘*’ Significant at 10% Level; ‘**’ Significant at the 5% Level, ‘***’ Significant at the 1% Level 
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Table 8: Regressions of Default risk as a function of the Leverage GAP 
The dependent variable is dtd, distance-to-default, calculated via the Moody’s KMV framework explained in the 
text. Independent variables are ‘Firm Size’, the natural log of the total assets of the firm at year end; ‘CEO 
Leverage’, reflecting the CEO specific compensation leverage; ‘Firm Leverage’, total firm debt divided by the 
book value of equity; ‘Executive Age’, the age of the executive when the data is reported; ‘CEO Ownership’, a 
value representing the percentage of the company owned by the CEO; and year variables to control for year 
effects. The sample contains 4,119, 1,325, 1,463, and 1,331firm-years representing data on 272 firms over the 
period 2000-2009. 
 
 Abs(CEO_Lev – Executive_Lev) 
Dependent Variable: Distance-to-Default All Firms Lowest Middle 
 
Highest 
Firm Size (log of total assets) -0.0677** -0.0933* -0.1643*** 0.1205** 
(-2.25) (-1.84) (-3.23) (2.37) 
Log (CEO Leverage) 0.0725*** 0.0859*** 0.0955*** 0.0173 
 (6.11) (5.19) (3.80) (0.71) 
Log (Firm Leverage (book value)) -0.0622*** -0.0798*** -0.0704** -0.0084 
(-3.31) (-2.92) (-2.19) (-0.23) 
CEO Age 0.0024 0.0005 0.0049 0.0018 
 (0.92) (0.11) (1.11) (0.38) 
Log (CEO Ownership) -0.0077 -0.0628*** 0.0327* 0.0345* 
 (-0.71) (-3.41) (1.79) (1.86) 
Year Indicator Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
  
Total Observations 4119 1325 1463 1331 
 
 
  
R^2 0.376 0.410 0.329 0.439 
‘*’ Significant at 10% Level; ‘**’ Significant at the 5% Level, ‘***’ Significant at the 1% Level 
44 
 
Table 9: 2SLS Regressions of Distance-to-Default on Funded vs. Unfunded Pensions 
The regression is 2SLS with instrumental variables ‘M’, a multiplier factor equivalent to the percentage of pension 
benefit for each dollar of compensation earned, and executive age during the sample firm year. The dependent 
variable is dtd, distance-to-default, calculated via the Moody’s KMV framework explained in the text. Independent 
variables are Industry Adj. Compensation Leverage , the compensation leverage for the CEO and the rest of the non-
CEO board for each firm year; Firm Size the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm at year end; Firm 
Leverage firm debt divided by firm equity; Gompers refers to the firm’s score (out of 24 points) on a series of 
common governance controls based on Gompers et. al (2003); Entrenchment (out of 6 points) a revised sub-series of 
governance variables based on the work of Bebchuck et. al. (2009); Salary and Bonus / Assets, executive salary and 
bonus values scaled by firm asset size; Option Value / Assets executive option value scaled by firm asset size; 
Executive Ownership, a logged value representing the percentage of the company owned by the CEO; Firm Age the 
age of the firm; Liquidity and Tax dummy variables representing whether the firm reported a negative income or a 
net operating loss carryover during that firm year; and year variables to control for year effects. The sample contains 
1,472 and 424 firm-years representing data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2006.  
 
Gompers Model Entrenchment Model 
Dependent Variable: Distance-to-Default Unfunded Funded Unfunded Funded 
Industry Adj. Compensation Leverage 0.8706** -0.1783 1.0565** -0.1511 
2.53 (0.96) 2.25 (1.09) 
Firm Size -0.2393 0.1663* -0.3272 0.1377** 
(1.64) 1.87 (1.58) (2.24) 
Firm Leverage -0.1187** -0.0329** -0.1175** -0.0353** 
(2.33) (1.99) (2.06) (2.48) 
Gompers -0.0301*** -0.0076   
(2.84) (0.58)   
Entrenchment   -0.0903** -0.0382** 
  (2.31) (2.40) 
Salary and Bonus / Assets -0.0035 0.0148*** -0.0038 0.0145*** 
(1.28) 3.89 (1.18) 3.88 
Option Value / Assets -0.0022 0.0028 -0.0031 0.0022 
(1.24) 1.62 (1.59) 1.28 
Executive Ownership -0.0563 0.1629*** -0.0780 0.1680*** 
(1.01) 3.95 (1.10) 4.12 
Firm Age 0.1555 -0.3180 0.1349 -0.3383* 
(0.92) (1.64) (0.71) (1.77) 
Liquidity Dummy -0.1987*** 0.2331*** -0.2106** 0.2194*** 
(2.85) 3.37 (2.56) 3.54 
Tax Dummy -1.3069*** -0.9600*** -1.5650** -0.9576*** 
(2.68) (3.12) (2.37) (3.63) 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instrumental Variables M, ExecAge M, ExecAge M, ExecAge M, ExecAge 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 1472 424 1472 424 
‘*’ Significant at 10% Level; ‘**’ Significant at the 5% Level, ‘***’ Significant at the 1% Level 
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Table 10: Fixed Effects Model for Leverage GAP and Default Risk 
The regression is a robust fixed effects model controlling for firm-level fixed effects. The dependent variable is dtd, 
distance-to-default, calculated via the Moody’s KMV framework explained in the text. Independent variables are 
‘Firm Size’, the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm at year end; ‘CEO Leverage’, reflecting the CEO 
specific compensation lerage; ‘Firm Leverage’, total firm debt divided by the book value of equity; ‘Executive 
Age’, the age of the executive when the data is reported; ‘Executive Ownership’, a value representing the 
percentage of the company owned by the executive; Gompers, referring to the firm’s score (out of 24 points) on a 
series of common governance controls based on Gompers et. al (2003); Tax and Liquidity  dummy variables 
representing whether the firm reported a net operating loss carryover during that firm year  or a negative income; 
and finally, year variables to control for year effects.  
 
Abs(CEO_Lev – Executive_Lev) 
Dependent Variable: Distance-to-Default Lowest Middle 
 
Highest 
Firm Size (log of total assets) -0.3905** -0.3932*** 0.1191 
(-2.33) (-2.92) (0.67) 
Log (CEO Leverage) 0.2287*** 0.1180* -0.1500*** 
 (5.81) (1.90) (-3.35) 
Log (Firm Leverage (book value)) -0.0873 -0.0883 -0.0325 
(-1.36) (-1.49) (-0.32) 
Executive Age -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0040 
 (-0.49) (0.41) (0.70) 
Log (Executive Ownership) 0.0168 0.0173 0.0247 
 (0.02) (0.75) (1.01) 
Gompers (Governance Variables) 0.0865*** -0.0584** -0.0597 
 (2.60) (-2.04) (-1.50) 
Tax Dummy -0.0999 0.1067 0.0467 
 (-0.97) (0.82) (0.30) 
Liquidity Dummy -0.1188 0.0613 -0.1531 
 (-0.39) (0.16) (-0.50) 
 
Year Indicator Variables Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared (within) 0.718 0.504 0.640 
R-Squared (overall) 0.330 0.332 0.313 
‘*’ Significant at 10% Level; ‘**’ Significant at the 5% Level, ‘***’ Significant at the 1% Level 
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Do Managers Save Shareholders’ Dividends for Their Retirement? 
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1. Introduction  
Corporate managers are assumed to represent the shareholders, and thus should take actions 
that maximize the value of equity. Yet, managers often have their own incentives that are not 
always aligned with shareholders' interests. These include reputation concerns (Narayanan 
(1985)), empire-building interests (Jensen’s (1986)), risk-aversion due to undiversified wealth 
and human capital invested in the firm (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Treynor and Black (1976); 
Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005)), and compensation-based incentives: meeting short-
term bonus targets (Waegelein (1988)), risk-taking incentives due to large stock-options holdings 
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)), and lowering the likelihood of default that risks pension 
payouts (Sundaram and Yermack (2007)).  
We investigate how compensation-based considerations, particularly the prospect of pension 
plans, affect the firm's current dividend policy. Literature suggests that managers who are 
heavily compensated with debt-based instruments such as pensions will react more 
conservatively, as demonstrated in Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and White (2011). While 
these studies focus on the default risk as a tool to protect future pension payouts, we analyze the 
cash-flow policy. We argue that managers with high pension holdings will be more reluctant to 
adopt high dividend policy. Once the firm announces a certain level of dividend, it essentially 
commits to distribute funds to shareholders in the coming years, as cutting or omitting dividends 
will have negative consequences in terms of both the stock price and the reputation of the 
managers (see, e.g., Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995)). Thus, managers with larger pension 
plans will prefer to avoid such cash-distribution commitment that will “leave” less funds 
available for their pension payouts.  More favorable options therefore for such managers will be 
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keeping funds in the firms or distributing cash to shareholders through open market stock 
repurchase that does not commit the firm to future cash payouts.  
This study is the first to empirically test whether executive pension values have a direct 
effect on firm cash flow. We consider two measures of the extent of pension value. The first is 
the present value of the pension of the manager divided by the sum of the present value of 
pension and the values of the stocks and stock-options held by the manager (referred to as 
'compensation leverage'). This measure captures the relative importance of pension in the 
manager's compensation package. The second is the present value of the pension divided by the 
book value of the firm's total assets, which captures the magnitude of the firm's inside debt.  
 To estimate the present value of pension we manually collected data on pension plans for 
272 of the largest firms listed on the U.S. stock exchanges over a ten-year period between 2000 
and 2009. Instead of a CEO-only database used in previous studies, all firm executives (typically 
five per firm year) are used to compute compensation leverage and inside debt ratios in this 
study.  
The regression results support our expectation: high levels of compensation leverage and 
inside debt are associated with consistently lower dividend yield and dividend payout ratio. This 
association remains significant when using compensation data of both the CEO-only and all 
firm's executives', and is robust to the estimation procedure. We further show that the observed 
effect of pension value on dividend policy is not driven by endogeneity -- i.e., by the possibility 
that firms that typically maintain a lower level of dividends can direct more funds into pension 
plans.  
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The results above capture the effect on pension plans on the managers’ decision to pay 
dividends against all other possible uses of the firm’s cash, including re-investment or keeping 
funds in the company. We further explore how the extent of pensions affects the form of payout. 
That is, even after deciding about the optimal cash that should be distributed to shareholders, the 
manager can still choose a preferred form of the payout: cash dividend or stock repurchase. We 
thus expect that managers with more future pension payouts will prefer the form of stock 
repurchase because it is perceived as one-time payout, while dividend is viewed as long-term 
commitment. We find that the main results hold when adjusting the dividend payment to the net 
stock repurchase.  
 We also look at the level of protection of the executives’ pensions. We examine the 
details of the individual pension contracts, and find that a sizeable proportion of our sample firms 
(24%) offer pre-funded pensions via a rabbi trust. Funding a pension prior to the executive’s 
retirement weakens the cash-preserving incentive of the manager, since the risk of losing their 
pension is significantly more neutralized. We find that the negative effect of pension plans on 
dividend policy is significantly stronger when the pensions are unfunded. This is consistent with 
our hypothesis that managers consider the likelihood of getting their future pension payouts 
when making dividend policy decisions. 
The paper contributes to the literature by highlighting an agency theory aspect that has 
not yet discussed or tested: saving shareholders’ dividends for managers’ retirement. Prior 
studies have shown that managers can deviate from value-maximizing corporate decisions in 
order to serve their own interests, such as reputation concern, empire-building incentives, and 
short-term compensation targets. Along this line, we find that managers that are entitled to high 
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and especially unprotected pension payments will typically not commit to high cash dividend 
distributions that could be at the expense of their future pensions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
states our hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the methodology, Section 5 describes the data and 
estimation procedures, Section 6 tests the hypotheses and reviews our standards for robustness, 
and Section 7 concludes 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
 The basis for agency theory lies in the separation of ownership and control in a firm: 
shareholders may be the residual claimants of the corporation, but its executives ultimately 
control its immediate direction. Jensen (2000) outlined the three primary instruments that 
effectively reinforce this separation: hierarchal structures within the firm, governance by an 
outside board of directors, and the incentive (compensation) structure of the manager. This last 
characteristic is the focus of our paper. Pioneering work by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
provided the asset substitution (risk shifting) solution: executives should be compensated in the 
same ratio of debt to equity as exists in their own firms. Smith and Watts (1982) further 
identified the differences between non-performance based compensation, such as salary and 
pension, and performance-based compensation, such as equity awards and stock appreciation 
rights. Performance based compensation can be used to provide risk-taking incentives firms with 
substantial growth opportunities (Guay 1999), or to fit specific firm targets of managerial 
ownership and monitoring costs (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). For non-performance based 
compensation, Jenson (2000) considers the primary risks to be asset substitution (risk-shifting) 
51 
 
via reduced risk-taking to preserve firm value, over-retention of earnings within the firm, and 
underleverage via incentivized debt reduction.  Zingales (1998) acknowledges that while 
managers can take advantage of these incentives in the short-run, firm governance ensures that 
long-run  contracts should be generally efficient. 
 
 While theory strongly suggests a positive relationship between non-performance based 
compensation and earnings retention, the ‘dividend story’ remains significantly underreported in 
the literature. Since Black (1976), much research has focused on the ‘puzzling’ aspects of 
dividends: why some firms offer them, and why some do not. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that 
by paying dividends, shareholders are able to both influence manager risk-taking and pass 
executive monitoring costs onto the market. Dividends also have a substantial reputation 
component: Gomes (1999) finds that dividends are a form of reputational capital that improves a 
firm’s ability to raise capital. However, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) found that firms 
reduced dividends in response to financial distress. With regards to compensation incentives, 
research by Lambert et. al (1989) look at the effect that the adoption of executive options had on 
corporate dividend policy. They found that observed dividends were lower than expected, 
demonstrating that executive compensation can affect firm-wide dividend policy. Brown et. al 
(2007) considered the 2003 dividend tax cut to gauge whether stock ownership effected firm 
payout decisions, and find that executives with higher equity ownership are more likely to 
increase dividends.  
 
Several recent papers have also discussed executive compensation, firm behavior, and 
pensions.   The model described by John and John (1993) predicted a positive relationship 
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between firm leverage and executive compensation leverage, and additional empirical support in 
favor found by Bryan et. al. (2000) and Ortiz-Molina (2004).  Mehran (1995) looks at the equity 
story, finding that firm performance is enhanced by the equity concentration of manager 
compensation.  Bebchuck et. al. (2011), look at how the fraction of compensation given to the 
CEO in relation to other ‘top 5’ executives effects firm value and behavior, but they use an older 
database that omits pension calculations. Anantharam et. al. (2010) takes a considerable look at 
how inside debt effects loan contracts, and uses a smaller sample of pension data (2006-2008) 
using a database taken directly from ExecuComp. The researchers find that as compensation 
leverage increases, lenders offer lower spreads and less debt covenants. Cadman and Vincent 
(2011) find that the size of pensions is greater than expected than economic considerations 
suggest, and indicate that defined-benefit pension plans are ‘low-risk’ complements to other, 
riskier forms of executive compensation. Wei and Yermack (2011) consider the market reaction 
to pension plans. Looking at the first reports of executive pension disclosures following the 2007 
SEC reform, they find that high amounts of CEO pension compensation corresponded to high 
bond prices, lower equity prices, and lower volatility for firms. Their research also confirms that 
high levels of pension compensation corresponds to lower risk levels and a decline in firm 
enterprise value. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) provided the first sweeping study of the effects 
of CEO pension compensation on firm risk, and find that higher levels of inside correspond to 
lower risk taking by executives. Bennett et. al. (2012) found this was also true among banks in 
the recent crisis, and suggested that higher levels of inside debt may help insulate the firm from 
marketwide volatility.   
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One of the most significant hurdles towards aligning executive and shareholder interests 
has been the horizon problem: executives have a limited tenure with the company, but are 
burdened with decision-making that affects the long-term cash flows of the firm. However, 
Edmans and Liu (2011) suggest that pensions offer the unique ability to incentivize managers to 
preserve firm value not only before bankruptcy but during bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, 
pensions might be a unique solution to this problem. The availability of data has prevented 
executive pension entitlements from being extensively studied until recently. Using a unique 
hand-collected executive pension database from 2000-2009, our study extends research in both 
dividend and agency theory.  
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
 
Manager compensation has both equity-like (stock and option awards) and debt-like (pension 
and deferred compensation) components. When a manager is compensated with a high-level of 
equity-based compensation, this more closely aligns his interests with those of the shareholder 
and encourages the executive to undertake projects that maximize equity value. High debt-like 
compensation more closely aligns the interest of the manager with the bondholder, and 
incentivizes the manager to ensure long-term cash flow preservation. Our paper focuses on how 
pension-based compensation affects major firm cash flow policy decisions: dividend yields, the 
payout ratio, and stock repurchases.  
Existing literature suggests that managers react conservatively when compensated with debt-
like instruments such as pensions (see Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). Since high-debt 
compensated managers seek to preserve the long-term viability of the firm to ensure the payout 
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of their pension entitlements, we expect this psychology will also factor into firm dividend 
policy.  Managers with high levels of pension-based compensation in the form of supplemental 
executive retirement plans (SERPs) will be less likely to commit high dividend levels, since 
dividends limit the cash flow available for reinvestment. By choosing lower dividends and 
greater reinvestment, the managers can maximize the long-term cash position of the firm. 
Consequently, we expect that higher pensions will correlate with lower dividend yields and 
higher levels of retained earnings.  
 Besides dividends, we examine how pensions affect the form of cash payout to 
shareholders. Dividends are a long-term commitment, and changes to dividend policy can 
substantially alter market perception of the firm. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that due 
to this reputational risk, firms under financial duress are more likely to reduce dividends than get 
rid of them altogether.  Alternatively, managers may choose to repurchase stock, since 
shareholders will perceive it as a one-time payout instead of a long-term commitment. We expect 
to find that when controlling for stock repurchases, pension-based compensation will still result 
in lower levels of dividends. 
Firms also maintain a choice of whether to pre-fund their executive pension entitlements or 
leave them unfunded. Firms with pre-funded pensions, found in 24% of our sample firms, 
establish a rabbi trust to hold the pension entitlement of each executive. For each manager, the 
ultimate question becomes whether the company will be willing and able to pay their pension 
entitlement upon retirement; by keeping their current pension entitlement funded, this reduces 
their cash-preserving incentives significantly.  
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Bachelder (2002) reports that a firm choosing to fund a SERP for an executive has a number 
of regulatory hurdles to overcome. Rabbi trusts are instruments that were developed to help to 
defer the taxability of a corporation or individual, and are natural vehicles for funding SERPs. A 
company can transfer financial assets to a rabbi trust for the exclusive benefit of the executive 
under the condition that the assets remain liable to the company’s creditors in a default. Despite 
the absence of creditor protection, we argue that the existence of the funded pension itself drives 
this incentive-neutralizing effect. This is especially true given that most managers are entitled to 
an actuarial lump-sum pension value on reaching retirement age
6
, leaving executives most 
concerned about losing their pension in the years leading up to their retirement
7
. Thus, our 
hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H1a: When pension size (determined by both compensation leverage and absolute pension value 
scaled by firm size) is higher, dividend yield will be lower. 
H1b: When pension size (determined by both compensation leverage and absolute pension value 
scaled by firm size), the payout ratio will be lower 
 
H2: Higher compensation leverage (pension values) are associated with lower dividend 
inclusive of the effects of stock repurchases. 
                                                          
6
 Lump-sum options are used by roughly 69% of our sample firms, and offers executives the ability to be awarded 
the actuarial value of their pension entitlement upon retirement rather than in annual installments. Managers who 
have this ‘option’ may be less concerned with long-range firm viability, since they can ‘cash out’ at retirement. 
While not reported here, we tested how the presence of lump sum payment effects dividend payments. Managers 
offer mildly lower dividend yields when the lump sum payment is unavailable. 
7
 The average age of our sample CEO is 56; the average non-CEO executive averages 53. Thus, 9 – 12 year time 
horizon until retirement is generally significant enough to affect dividend policy and other cash preservation effects.  
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H3: Firms maintaining funded executive pensions will report less of a negative correlation with 
firm dividend yield ratios than firms who do not fund their pensions. 
 
4. Methodology  
 
4a. Calculating Pension Data 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) explained the calculation of pension data in great detail 
with regards to inside debt. Using database of 237 Fortune 500 CEO’s over a 7-year period 
(1996-2002), they demonstrated the significant role of pensions as a form of debt-based 
compensation. The database used in this study seeks to improve Sundaram and Yermack’s prior 
work by using hand-collected data for 272 firms drawn from the 700 largest companies by 
market capitalization over a 10-year period (2000-2009). Instead of a CEO-only database, all 
firm executives (typically five per firm year) were used to compute inside debt in this study. The 
resulting sample includes three additional years and approximately six times more firm-year data 
points than the original Sundaram and Yermack sample.  
Pensions, as defined here, refer to Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans, or SERPs. 
SERPs allow executives to receive retirement benefits far greater than they would be normally 
entitled to under federal insurance guidelines. These pension benefits represent unfunded and 
unsecured debt claims against the firm, and in the event of insolvency, have equal standing with 
other unsecured creditors. The disclosure for pension valuation became significantly more 
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transparent in 2006; prior to this period, some calculation was needed to evaluate executive 
pensions.  
SEC statements, as a rule, require the summary compensation information for the CEO, 
CFO, and three other executives. Frequently, more than five executives have information 
available due to changes in management, or as a function of corporate reporting policy. Prior to 
July 2006, the SEC required that pension values be expressed in a tabled matrix of the form 
given in Table A1. The actual present value of the benefit was not required to be presented, but 
the value could be inferred and estimated by an investor using the procedure outlined in the next 
paragraphs. Firms with fiscal years on or after December 15, 2006 were required to adopt a new 
presentation that included a computation of formal present value calculations.  
The sample period encompasses both systems; prior to 2006, hand-calculation was used; 
after 2006, present values were used where available. Since both calculations employ identical 
(or nearly identical) calculation methodologies, the sample years are considered directly 
comparable and contiguous. The established method for computing pension values is the 
actuarial present value method, detailed and explained in the two equations below. A guided 
example using ConocoPhillips is provided in Appendix A to clarify the calculation procedure.  
The present value of a pension annuity is expressed by Equation A1: 
 
∑
 ( ) 
(   ) 
   
     (    )
 
 
(1) 
 
Where X is defined as the amount of the annual pension, A is the current age of the 
executive, R is the minimum retirement age to achieve full retirement benefit, K is the final year 
of the pension, and p(n) is the probability that the executive will be alive in n years. Using the 
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‘Period Life Table’, an actuarial life table available from the Social Security administration, the 
mortality probabilities for an executive of age A can be projected. While it is hypothetically 
possible an executive can receive a pension benefit indefinitely, the mortality projections of the 
Social Security administration end at 119 years, so K is for practical purposes set at 120 
following Sundaram and Yermack (2007).  
The discount rate, d, is defined as the annualized Moody’s Seasoned Aaa bond-rating for 
a given year, taken from the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release8. The firms maintaining 
pensions tend to be larger and older than average, and many have established a comparable bond 
rating. Furthermore, firms that volunteered present value data of pensions prior to 2006 used 
either the 10-year treasury bond yield or Aaa bond-rating for that year.  
The most difficult portion of this calculation involves the computation of X, the annual pension 
benefit. Companies offering executive pensions will typically report defined pension annuities in 
the form of a generic table relating final average earnings with years of credit service. Final 
average earnings reflect the executives’ highest annual average salary and bonus over a specified 
number of years. In this study, we assume that the most recent years’ of executive compensation 
are also the highest. 
To compute the annual pension benefit, we use Equation A2:  
 
∑
    
 
 
   
       
 
(2) 
 
                                                          
8
 Information is taken directly from the FRB archive of historical interest rate data, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm 
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Where    refers to the cash salary and bonus compensation to each executive for year t,   refers 
to the number of prior years whose compensation is averaged together, and S refers to the 
executives’ years of service. The years of service figure may relate todate of first hire, years of 
total work experience, or a number of methodologies employed by the firm. This information is 
provided in the same section as the pension plan table.  
M refers to the multiplicative factor that describes the pension plan table, and is best 
interpreted as the amount of pension benefit earned per year of service. For most firms, this 
figure is between 1.5 and 2.0% of average compensation per year of service.  
The net combination of these two equations produces the actuarial present value for the 
executive pension for that year.
9
 
 
4b. Computing Compensation Leverage 
The acquisition of the pension data provides us with the unique opportunity to study the 
compensation leverage of the individual executives. Following Eisdorferet. al. (2013), firm 
compensation leverage is defined as: 
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where j represents the number of top managers (most frequently five) in each firm in each year. 
Following Eisdorfer et. al (2013), we use the procedure developed by Core and Guay (2002) 
(also used by Sundaram and Yermack (2007)) as inputs to the Black-Scholes model to determine 
                                                          
9
Some firms will deduct anticipated social security benefits from the annual pension award; since these are far smaller than the annual benefits 
entitled to most executives, no deduction is made here. 
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the value of unexercised stock-options. Additionally, we compute the compensation leverage at 
the individual CEO-level following the same methodology.  
 
4c. Modeling Cash Flow Payout  
To model cash flow payout, we first set the dependent variable equal to the industry adjusted 
dividend yield. The selection of an industry adjustment was considered crucial to the 
understanding of how firms operate; individual industries have substantially different 
expectations of dividend payout and demands on capital structure and investment. We define 
dividend yield via the traditional methodology: dividends divided by share price.  
The general form of our dividend yield model takes two forms depending on our 
executive compensation proxy, compensation leverage or total pension value scaled by assets:  
                                  
                           (        )                       
                                                   
                                                                 
    
 
(4) 
 
In this sample, we subtract the dividend yield of the firm by the industry average to 
calculate our primary cash flow proxy. For our measure of executive compensation leverage, we 
use four different representations: industry-adjusted compensation leverage and scaled actuarial 
pension value for aggregate executive data at the firm level, and the same two variables using 
CEO data alone.  We further control by the natural log of firm size, firm leverage, distance-to-
default (calculated via the Merton-KMV framework; see Appendix B for details), and firm age. 
We also control for liquidity as a binary variable equal to 1 if a negative operating income was 
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posted for that year, and tax losses, equal to one if the firm reported a net tax loss carry forward 
during that firm year. Beginning of the year capital expenditures ‘capx’, prior year stock return 
‘stockreturn’; market-to-book ratio ‘mktbook’, and cash flows derived from operations in the 
prior year ‘cashflowoperations’ provide firm-level investment controls. We further add 10 year 
dummies to control for year effects during the  2000-2009 sample period. The model results 
reflect robust standard errors. 
The selection of control variables were largely taken from extant literature.  
One way to deal with the endogenous factors that characterize our financial research is to use an 
instrumental variable approach. In this example, we examine two factors are uniquely 
attributable to compensation leverage and not dividend ratio: executive age (which tends to rise 
as pensions rise), and ‘M’, a multiplicative factor that describes the ratio of pension benefits 
earned per dollar of compensation. Firms with higher ‘M’ values allocate more money per dollar 
to pension benefits that those with low ‘M’ values.  
We employ a two-stage least squares equation and retest our model with the two 
instrumental variables. Instruments were neither underidentified (Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic), 
overidentified (via the Hansen J Statistic), or particularly weak (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 
across all tests. Following the procedure outlined by Baum et. al. (2002), we determined the 
instrumental variables used were appropriate.  
 
4d. Modeling the Payout Ratio 
 Bhattacharyya (2007) establishes  a one-period contracting model  that considers the 
relationship between total manager compensation  ̅ , dividends declared, and stochastic output 
to be realized. Bhattacharyya (2008) uses this model to predict that a positive relationship exists 
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between dividend payout and both dividends declared and cash available. Their research 
accesses how   , available cash, will be allocated between investment and dividends in such a 
way that marginal compensation from dividend equals the marginal compensation from 
production. With diminishing marginal returns, managers will likely run into difficulty in paying 
higher dividends as cash increases: thus, their research establishes the link between    and the 
payout ratio. Their research found a positive relationship between executive compensation and 
earnings retention, defined here as the inverse of dividend payout.  
 However, Bhattacharyya (2008) assumes that all forms of executive compensation 
produce this positive result, and their research does not include pensions as a factor. Tying our 
research back into agency theory and compensation leverage, different forms of compensation 
will motivate managers to behave differently. Option awards align executive interests with their 
shareholders, and higher should produce a positive effect for earnings retention. Pensions would 
have the opposite effect. Instead of viewing compensation as a more or less homogenous basket 
that encourages earnings retention, we can see the respective differences that these ‘debt’ and 
‘equity’ awards have on the payout ratio, and inversely, earnings retention.   
Our aim is to demonstrate that higher pensions correspond to lower levels of dividend 
payout, so our pension coefficients were expected to be negative. For our dependent variable, we 
use the dividend payout ratio and the Bhattacharyya (2008) research model. We further include 
other compensation variables to demonstrate and differentiate between the other significant 
salary effects. We again use to metrics to define company pension values: compensation 
leverage, and the actuarial value of executive pensions scaled by firm asset size. Our payout ratio 
model, a Tobit regression, also takes two forms, depending on the compensation proxy, 
compensation leverage or pension value scaled by assets:  
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(5) 
Our control variables include salary, bonus, and option values scaled by firm asset size. 
Dividend refers to the number of cash dividends declared during the year; Ln(Income) refers to 
the log of the income available to common shareholders; DebtEq refers to the firms’ long-term 
debt divided by equity for the year; MktBook is the market value of firms’ common shares 
divided by shareholders’ equity; Capx are capital expenditures during the year; Beta refers to the 
monthly fundamental beta reported by Compustat; Firmsize is the natural log of the firm end-of-
year market capitalization; Stockreturn is the prior years’ stock return; and Cashflowoperations 
refers to the prior years’ cash flow derived from operations; lastly, we control for industry 
effects.  We test both raw and industry-adjusted values for compensation leverage and pension 
value scaled by assets. Like our previous models, the model results reflect robust standard errors. 
As in model (4), we also retest the model in a two-stage least squares equation with the 
two instrumental variables. Following the procedure outlined by Baum et. al. (2002), we 
determined the instrumental variables used were appropriate.  
 
4e. Modeling Dividends and Net Stock Repurchases 
To test whether our dividend model is affected when stock repurchases are considered, 
we employ a similar test to our firm model. The dependent variable, dividends less net stock 
repurchases, is defined as the dividend payout less the difference between stock sales 
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(Compustat: SSTK) and stock repurchases (Compustat: PRSTKC), scaled by asset size, for any 
given firm year:  
 
                                      
          (                                 )
               
 
(6) 
 
We follow a similar regression model to (4): 
                                     
                                                (        )
                           
                                                
                                                        
 
 
(7) 
 Following our hypothesis, we expect that the regression coefficient on the cash flow 
variable will be negative, as higher compensation leverage should result in low dividend values 
and a higher level of net stock repurchases.  
 
5. Data 
 
Our unique dataset reflects a hand-collected series of executive pension values from 2000 
to 2009. To determine the sample size, the 700 largest firms by US market capitalization on 
December 31, 2009 were examined: of these, 300 offered executive pensions (42%), while 290 
(41%) provided values calculable under the Sundaram and Yermack framework. We reduced our 
sample size further, omitting firms with impartial or unclear compensation data, executive 
structure, and merging issues with stock and option data. Company financial data was obtained 
via Compustat, and stock and market values determined through CRSP.  
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The resulting dataset included 272 firms and 8,955 executive-year data points, consisting 
of 2,114 CEOs-years (23.6%) and 6,851 Non-CEO executive-years (76.4%) over the period 
2000-2009. This was slightly reduced when accounting for the rest of the available data; Table 1 
provides a substantial overview of the executive compensation data collected as a part of this 
sample. CEOs in the sample averaged 56 years old and had personal compensation leverage of 
0.18; non-CEO executives were aged 53 on average with a personal compensation leverage of 
0.25. 
Sample firms were on the whole larger and older than firms of the non-sample general 
population. They were also substantially less risky than the overall market; the average Beta 
across all firm sample-years was 0.45. The average age of firms sampled was approximately 92 
years, due to the self-selection of mature firms consistently observed in prior studies. During the 
period distance-to-default varied widely, but averaged 2.534 standard deviations for each firm. 
DtD was highest (least risky) during 2005, and lowest in 2008, when an average of 1.27 was 
reported. Like other indicators, its variation coincided with the general economic conditions of 
the period.  
The average actuarial pension value across 8,399 executive firm-years was $3.712 
million, equating to roughly 28% of total executive annual compensation in any given period. 
Compensation leverage for CEOs averaged 0.183 with a median value of 0.129. Firm level 
compensation leverage, following the Eisdorfer et. al (2013) procedure, similarly averaged 0.207 
with a median of 0.164. The most substantial increase in compensation leverage was observed 
during the 2008 financial crisis, when leverage values across all executives doubled in a single 
year. Higher leverage is associated with less risk-taking behavior: while a necessary 
characteristic in avoiding adversity, it is not a strong guarantor of high shareholder returns.  
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1.6% of the sample executive firm-years reported a negative operative income that year, and 
75.6% of firms reported a net carryforward tax loss. CEOs made up approximately 23.5% of our 
total executive sample.  
In Table 2, we divide the sample into 10 industries based upon their two-digit SIC code. 
Due to the fairly small number of sample firms (272), the division aimed to provide a 
satisfactory basis for generating our industry adjustments. Manufacturing firms dominated the 
overall sample with 130 (48%) of firms. 47 firms (17.3%) were in the Financial Sector, 46 
(16.9%) in the Utility sector, and 15 (5.5%) in the Mining sector. The sample also provided the 
opportunity to analyze the dividend payout ratios with respect to each industry, varying 
considerably from -0.457 (Mining) to 4.240 (Wholesale Trade). Dividend yield computed in this 
fashion can result in extraordinarily large differences between industries. Frequently cyclical 
mining firms typically reported dividends even during periods of negative income; likewise, 
firms engaged in wholesale trade reported dividends much higher than their respective net 
incomes. To control for industry relevance in the study, we establish the average dividend yield 
for each sample industry and subtract it from individual firm dividend yields.
10
  
Overall, the  data offers a more diverse and versatile basis than provided by Sundaram 
and Yermack (2007), whose sample consisted of 237 firms with 1,659 observations over the 
seven year period 1996-2002.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 For example, a firm reporting a payout ratio of 0.60 while the industry average is 0.40. The ‘industry adjusted’ 
payout ratio for the firm is 0.60 – 0.40 = 0.20.  
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6. Empirical Results 
6.1  Hypothesis 1a  
 We examine the determinants of industry-adjusted dividend yield in Table 3. The objective 
of our hypotheses is to determine if the compensation leverage and scaled pension actuarial value 
have a negative effect on the dividend yield. Consistent with our methodology, we subtract the 
values by the industry average to adjust for these effects. Four regressions are offered using 
industry-adjusted data. Table 3 divides the results into both ‘firm-level’ and ‘CEO-level’ data – 
enabling an assessment of individual CEO compensation effects against those of the entire 
executive team.  
 Both raw and industry-adjusted compensation leverage were significantly negative, as 
expected. There was no significance for the combined salary and bonus figures, and options 
scaled by asset size were significantly positive – consistent with agency theory. Since options 
align executive interests with shareholders, higher values here indicate that firms increase 
dividends accordingly. However, the affect is significantly overshadowed by the stronger 
pension affect. Larger firms and firms that were farther from default also generate lower 
dividend yield. While seemingly contradictory, ‘safer’ firms (as judged by distance-to-default) 
remain safer due to higher levels of executive compensation driving managers to behave more 
conservatively vis-à-vis Sundaram and Yermack (2007). This is an endogeneity issue that can 
only be partially remedied via our 2SLS model in Table 4. 
 When we consider pensions via their scaled actuarial value (Table 3, Column 2), we again 
confirm that pensions reduce dividend yield. While less significance exists, the results are 
consistent with the compensation leverage definition: options generate higher dividends, larger 
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and safer firms report lower dividend yield. In columns 3 and 4, we repeat the regression but use 
individual (rather than grouped) CEO data.  
 CEO level data generates similar significance confirming the lower dividend yield of high 
compensation leverage managers. When using CEO data, we observe that both salaried 
compensation and option compensation generate significantly higher dividend yield. This 
demonstrates the ‘counterweight’ effects of pensions: options and salaries may serve to align 
managers with stockholder interests, but pensions act as a counterweight that aligns them with 
company bondholders. So instead of a homogenous compensation basket, we have a number of 
different parts – two factors move in one direction, one factor moves strongest in another.  
  The same effects with greater significance for salary/bonus and options were observed when 
using scaled pension data. The data aligned consistently with firm-level data. However, to 
counter the endogeneity problems associated with the pension/dividend effect, we adapt a 2SLS 
instrumental variable model to counter this. Using ‘M’ and ‘executive age’ as the factors that 
most uniquely describe compensation leverage and pension value, we again re-attempt the 
regressions. Table 4 examines both the firm and CEO-level results. 
 The results were remarkably consistent with our previous estimates, demonstrating that the 
effect of executive pensions had on dividend yield is very much a real one. While both 
compensation leverage and scaled pension values were consistently negatively correlated to 
dividend yield, some significance was lost in considering other forms of executive compensation. 
While remaining positive, the option effect was significantly muted.  
 Other factors, such as distance-to-default and the size of the firm, remained significant. 
Considering the individual CEO-level data in Table 3, we find that pensions remain significantly 
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negatively correlated while other types of compensation were positively correlated with dividend 
yield. Also conforming to agency theory, we find a negative correlation for firm leverage in 
respect to dividend yield. In these four tests, we demonstrate significant evidence in favor of 
inside debt effecting firm dividend yield. Consistently, we note the negative relationship between 
both the relative and absolute amounts of pension debt maintained by the manager and the firms’ 
ultimate dividend yield.  The results are also significant in economic terms. For example, we find 
that a one standard deviation increase in CEO-level compensation leverage further decreases 
dividend yield by 0.14 to 0.17 percent. 
6.2  Hypotheses 1b 
 In these hypotheses, we consider whether payout ratios are negatively correlated to higher 
manager compensation using the Bhattacharyya (2008) framework. In Table 5, we present the 
Tobit results for the Payout Ratio at both the firm and CEO level. At the firm level, we find that 
higher compensation leverage and actuarial pension values generate lower payout ratios. Salary 
and Bonus was also positively significant, and options (as expected) were negatively correlated 
when we used the compensation leverage proxy. Larger firms and those associated with high 
levels of capital expenditure generally had higher payout ratios and lower retained earnings.  At 
both the CEO and Firm (aggregate) levels, our results remain consistent: higher levels of 
pension-based compensation generate lower levels of dividend payout. Salary and bonus 
compensation was significantly negative only among CEOs using compensation leverage as the 
pension size proxy; option-based compensation was significantly positive across all regressions. 
We conclude that in addition to these pension relationships, and higher levels of option and 
stock-based compensation correspond to higher dividend payouts.  
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 Our results are retested under the 2SLS framework in Table 6. At the CEO level, we find that 
a very strong negative correlation exists between compensation leverage and pension size and 
the dividend payout ratio. Our results suggest that a 0.01 point increase in compensation leverage 
above the industry average corresponds to a significant 0.055 point-decrease in dividend payout. 
At the firm level, however, we find reduced significance when we include instrumental 
variables: therefore, the effect of the CEO outweighs the combined general effect of all the 
managers. Likewise, executive compensation at the non-CEO level may serve to balance the 
earnings retention behavior of high pension compensation CEOs.  As with dividend yield, we 
find payout ratio is significant in economic terms. A one standard deviation increase in CEO-
level compensation leverage further decreases dividend payout by 0.06 to 0.08.  
6.3 Hypothesis 2 
 In Table 7, we examine how pensions, dividends, and net stock repurchases are affected by 
differing levels of debt-based compensation at both the firm and CEO level. When scaling 
pension actuarial value size, we find a significant negative relationship between dividends less 
net stock repurchases and the size of the pensions. Large pension values are an important factor 
in reducing dividend yield when incorporating net stock repurchases. When we use a 
compensation leverage pension-size proxy, the results are positive but insignificant. This an 
interesting finding, since it qualifies dividend yield relative to the other major use of firm cash 
flow – the repurchase of stock. We find that managers with more future pension payouts will 
prefer stock repurchases because it is perceived as one-time payout, while dividend is viewed as 
long-term commitment. 
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 However, we expect that the differences between compensation leverage and the scaled 
actuarial pension values are driven by a resistance on the part of the manager to repurchase 
stock. Stock repurchases will maximize share price, but when managers are not given a 
substantial amount of equity compensation relative to debt compensation, there are not 
necessarily incentivized to do so. The manager may likewise elect to neither pay dividends nor 
repurchase stock, so adjusting the dividend payout in this way may produce noisy results. Still, 
we find under at least one definition of pension values that debt-based manager compensation is 
significantly negatively correlated to dividends less stock repurchases.  
6.4 Hypothesis 3 
 Next, we consider the effect of pension funding status on dividend yield at the CEO level 
(Table 8) and the firm (Table 9). Using as our dependent variable the industry-adjusted dividend 
yield, we divide our sample into funded and unfunded pensions at the firm level. Further, we also 
continued the use of our two different compensation leverage proxies: compensation leverage, 
and pensions scaled by asset size. We find that when pensions were funded (columns 1 and 3), 
observed manager conservatism was less than when pensions were not funded (columns 2 and 
4). Using the pension/asset compensation leverage measure (column 3), we completely eliminate 
the significance of reduced dividends in case of funded pensions. Unfunded pensions, those 
whose assets are not funded via a rabbi trust, remained significant. When we consider the CEO 
specific data, we find that funding CEO pensions reduces the cash flow effects entirely (column 
3) when using scaled actuarial pension value as our compensation proxy.  
 This has several implications. First, funding pensions reduces the risk that the manager will 
pay less dividends. Second, this affect is not substantial enough to merit funding pensions as an 
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effective strategy to counteract the executive conservatism arising from large defined benefit 
compensation. This is persistent despite the fact that a rabbi trusts offers no actual protection 
from firm risk; creditors of a bankrupt firm can still go after the rabbi trusts’ assets. However, the 
actual existence of their pension entitlement – rather than only a promise of receiving one – is 
enough to provide executives with significant ‘peace of mind’. Indeed, combined with lump-sum 
provisions and the numerous contractual options provided to executives, the actual likelihood of 
an executive not receiving his or her pension is probably quite low. However, since rabbi trusts 
are still not used heavily among large US firms, the sample size was also limited, and may be too 
specific to generate sweeping conclusions. Still, it remains the first test to our knowledge to 
consider the effect of pension funding in the context of dividend yield and firm risk.  
 We also test pension funding status on the dividend payout ratio for CEOs (Table 10) and 
aggregated at the firm level (Table 11). Similarly, we find that unfunded pensions generated 
consistently negative correlations between pension compensation and dividend payout at the 
CEO level. Unfunded pensions demonstrated substantially greater risk shifting than funded 
pensions. When pensions are funded, at both the firm and CEO level, dividend payout was 
significantly higher. Yet, when the pensions were unfunded, the dividend payout ratio was lower 
– suggesting a substantial difference in the way managers behave in regards to differences in 
their pension funding status.  
6.5 Robustness 
 In Table 12 we offer our dividend-payout robust fixed affects model at both the firm and 
CEO-level. We find that at the firm-level, controlling for firm specific fixed effects have no 
substantial effects on the reduced dividend yield determined by higher levels of compensation 
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leverage. We also report clustered standard errors and raw data, defined as the non-industry 
adjusted compensation leverage and scaled actuarial pension values. The findings are further 
robust in the Fama-MacBeth (1973) framework, as well as using Newey-West standard errors 
with six annual cross-sections. At the CEO-level, we find that same consistent negative 
correlations between high compensation leverage and dividend yield. For pensions scaled by 
assets, we find that the significance persists, even while somewhat reduced.  
 In Panel B, we apply the same metrics to the model we examined in Table 5. At the firm 
level, we find the same, significant, negative results – high pension compensation generates 
lower dividend payout ratios. At the CEO-level, the results are more muddled; defining pension 
size by its scaled actuarial value, we report generally insignificant but negative results. Using 
compensation-leverage, the results are negative and significant. For Fama-MacBeth and Newey-
West results, are results remain negative but we lose some significance; since the Tobit model 
cannot be used in these regressions, we expect that these are affected by the significant number 
of zero-payout firms. Generally, our findings underlie a primary theme in our analysis: 
exclusively considering the CEO the only influential executive factor in the determination of 
firm decision making is not demonstrating the whole story. The entire executive team plays a 
significant role in making these determinations, and when we aggregate them at the firm level, 
we’re generating a better picture of the overall character of executive compensation in a 
particular firm.  
7. Conclusion 
 This paper considers whether executives’ pensions have an effect on firm cash flow 
policy. Building on existing literature in both agency theory and dividends, we predict that 
74 
 
higher levels on debt-based compensation would result in lower dividend yields and dividend 
payout ratios. We also predicted the results would hold when adjusting for stock repurchases, 
and that pre-funding pensions via a rabbi-trust would neutralize these risks.  
Using our hand-collected database on executive compensation, we find significant 
empirical support for our prediction. Consistent with agency theory, higher levels of executive 
pensions generated a more restrictive firm dividend policy and greater retained earnings. We 
demonstrate that at both the firm and individual-CEO-level, a significantly negative correlation 
exists between dividend yield and levels of inside debt. Likewise, we find significant evidence 
that suggest that the payout ratio is strongly correlated with lower pension values. We also 
considered how the extent of pensions affects the form of payout. We find that managers with 
higher pension compensation prefer stock repurchases to dividend payouts, because they are 
perceived as one-time payouts while dividend is viewed as long-term commitment. We find that 
the main results hold when adjusting the dividend payment to the net stock repurchases, and that 
the negative effect of pension plans on dividend policy is significantly stronger when the 
pensions are unfunded.  
More important for compensation policy, it becomes clear how pensions have become the 
answer to options in influencing executive behavior.  Higher pension values are associated with a 
lower dividend yield and more conservative behavior with executives; high option values and 
low compensation leverage align executives with equity holders. The complexity of these 
compensation effects is just beginning to be understood, but there effect on individual firm 
investment policy can be significant. We expect that as debt-based executive compensation is 
subjected to greater analysis, investors will be more informed as to the consequences that 
executive compensation has on their ultimate firm performance.  
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Appendix A: An example of the pension value estimation procedure  
 
Using ConocoPhillips as an example firm, we can establish how the pension computation is 
performed for each executive. In this case, James J. Mulva, the President and CEO of 
ConocoPhillips in 2002, provides the example representation.  
In Table A1, we have produced the same pension table disclosure available to investors of 
ConocoPhillips in fiscal year 2002. While investors may reference annual reports to access these 
tables, they are presented more conveniently in Definitive 14A statements. The table records 
years of service in five-year increments on the horizontal axis, and final average earnings in 
$500,000 increments on the vertical axis. Final average earnings are defined as the average of the 
three highest years of salary and bonus awards in the ten years prior to retirement. We assume 
the most recent three years of Mr. Mulva’s compensation are his three highest years of 
compensation in the last ten years, yielding a three-year average of $4.487 million in earnings 
credited towards retirement.  
For each executive firm-year, a sufficient historical salary and bonus level of each executive 
was computed. To begin the sample at 2000, firms requiring three years of historical 
compensation needed SEC data beginning in 1998, and for firms requiring five years, 1996 was 
the first year of hand-collection. For many executives, especially those requiring five or more 
years of averaged compensation to compute their earnings, historical data was unavailable for as 
much time as was needed. To compute average compensation for these executives, salaries and 
bonuses were ‘downwardly weighted’ to the oldest year. For example, if five years of data was 
required to average an executive’s compensation and four years were available, the most recent 
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three years were waited equally and the most distant year double-weighted to generate a five-
year proxy.   
Mr. Mulva’s widely-available birth year of 1946 establishes his age at the end of 2002 at 56; 
for other executives, age information was obtained from 10-Ks (when available), and using a 
variety of other sources including old news articles, obituaries, and public records indexing 
services. Retirement age to achieve full benefit is 65.  
The multiplicative factor M can be determined algebraically from Table A1: the addition of 
every $1,000,000 in final average earnings generates $320,000 of additional pension 
compensation for 20 years of service; this corresponds to 0.32 for 20 years, or 0.016 (1.6%) of 
final average earnings for each year of service. Mulva, as of 2002, has 31 years of service credit 
towards retirement. 
Table A1 
Pension Plan Disclosure for ConocoPhillips, FY 2002 
The pension benefit table is taken directly from the FY 2002 DEF-14A statement filed by ConocoPhillips on April 4, 2003, p.24. 
 Years of Credited Service at Normal Retirement 
Final 
Average 
Earnings 
20 25 30 35 40 
 750,000  240,000 300,000 360,000 420,000 480,000 
1,250,000  400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 800,000 
1,750,000  560,000 700,000 840,000 980,000 1,120,000 
2,250,000  720,000 900,000 1,080,000 1,260,000 1,440,000 
2,750,000  880,000 1,100,000 1,320,000 1,540,000 1,760,000 
3,250,000  1,040,000 1,300,000 1,560,000 1,820,000 2,080,000 
3,750,000  1,200,000 1,500,000 1,800,000 2,100,000 2,400,000 
4,250,000  1,360,000 1,700,000 2,040,000 2,380,000 2,720,000 
4,750,000  1,520,000 1,900,000 2,280,000 2,660,000 3,040,000 
5,250,000  1,680,000 2,100,000 2,520,000 2,940,000 3,360,000 
5,750,000  1,840,000 2,300,000 2,760,000 3,220,000 3,680,000 
6,250,000  2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 4,000,000 
6,750,000  2,160,000 2,700,000 3,240,000 3,780,000 4,320,000 
7,250,000  2,320,000 2,900,000 3,480,000 4,060,000 4,640,000 
7,750,000  2,480,000 3,100,000 3,720,000 4,340,000 4,960,000 
The Pension Plan Table section of the Definitive 14A provides the following information: “The Pension Plan Table below shows the 
maximum estimated straight-life annual benefits payable at age 65 for the final average earnings indicated, prior to reductions 
required by the companies’ plans for Social Security benefits. The current years of service, as of December 31, 2002 for the Named 
Executive Officers for retirement benefit purposes are: Mr. Mulva, 31 years; Mr. Dunham, 36 years; Mr. McKee, 35 years; 
Mr. Nokes, 32 years; and Mr. Harrington, 23 years.” 
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We can assume that Mulva will work through his 65th year, at which point he will retire with 
40 years of service.
11
 Following Equation (2), we can calculate his annual pension entitlement 
credited upon retirement as 0.016 x 40 x $4.487= $2.872 million.  
To complete Equation (1), we require Mulva’s age, A (56); R, the company’s retirement age 
(65); d, the cost of long-term debt; and P(n), the probability that Mulva will be alive and 
receiving pension disbursements n years into the future. The cost of long term debt, determined 
from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H15 for Moody’s Aaa rated bonds was d=0.0649 for 
2002. Using the statistical tables provided by the U.S. Social Security Administration, we can 
infer that Mulva has an 88.3% chance of being alive to receive his first payment at the age of 66, 
86.7% chance of surviving until age 67, and so forth until age 120.
12
  
The summation of each year’s actuarial present value contribution establishes our present value 
of Mulva’s pension benefit at the end of 2002: $13.673 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Mr. Mulva was 56 with 31 years of service in 2002; he was eligible to achieve full retirement benefits in 2011, at 
which point he would have had 40 years of service (31+(65-56)).  
12
 The odds of Mulva surviving even to age 111 are so minimal, that no additional present value is added beyond 
this age. Thus, the age 120 truncation is appropriate based on current longevity estimates.  
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Appendix B: Calculation of Distance-to-Default 
 
The approximation of this model is: 
 
V
DPTV
DtD


  
(A1) 
where Distance-to-Default (DtD) is equal to the firm’s asset market value (V) less the default 
point (DPT) of a firm, divided by the volatility of the firm’s assets (σV). Under the DPT, equity 
holders have a call option to purchase the firms assets; the value of the call is equal to the 
observable equity value. In its current form, the equation is not estimable – two unknowns, V 
and σ, need to be computed first. We know from stochastic calculus that equity volatility and 
asset volatility are related: 
 

 
 
 
 
   
(A2) 
 
In this equation, equity volatility (
 
) is observable, E is the market value of equity,    is the 
derivative of the option function with respect to firm value (the delta of the equity holders’ call 
option). Via SAS, these two equations can be solved simultaneously to generate values of Vand 
σ, which can be used to generate a value for DtD for each firm-year. Higher values of DtD 
indicate the firm is farther from default, and therefore less risky.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Empirical Variables 
Columns reflect mean, standard deviation, and ‘N’, the number of firm-years for each variable. P25, P50, and P75 indicate 
the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of each variable. Firm Market Capitalization is the end of year firm stock price multiplied 
by the number of shares outstanding; Market-to-Book is the market value of firms’ common shares divided by shareholders’ 
equity; Debt/Equity refers to the firms’ long-term debt divided by equity for the year; Capital expenditures reflect the 
reported values during the year; Beta refers to the monthly fundamental beta reported by Compustat; DtD, or distance-to-
default, is calculated via the methodology explained in Appendix B; the Payout Ratio is defined as dividends granted/income 
available to shareholders); Firm Age refers to the age of the firm as reported via Compustat; Dividend Yield is the value of 
the annual dividend per share divided by the stock price; Compensation leverage is the present value of the pension of the 
firm’s top managers divided by the present value of pension and the values of the stocks and stock-options held by the 
managers; Pension, Salary and Bonus, and Option values are scaled by total asset size; executive age refers to the age of the 
executive during the particular firm year; ‘M’ is a multiplier value roughly equivalent to the per-dollar percentage of pension 
contribution for each dollar earned; liquidity constraint is a binary variable equal to 1 if a negative operating income was 
posted for that year; tax losses are equal to one if the firm reported a net tax loss carry forward during that firm year. Data is 
on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009. 
Firm Variables N Mean Std. Dev. 0.25 Median 0.75 
ln(Firm Market Capitalization) 2098 4.185 0.692 3.721 4.193 4.557 
Market-to-Book Ratio 1976 0.331 1.182 0.160 0.247 0.395 
Debt/Equity 1929 0.854 9.446 0.315 0.600 1.122 
Capital Expenditures (Millions) 2016 1340 2093 141.8 383.0 1262 
Capital Expenditures / Assets (x1000) 2016 0.064 1.801 0.012 0.041 0.116 
Beta 1885 0.451 0.446 0.140 0.378 0.696 
DtD 2097 2.534 1.251 1.640 2.320 3.226 
Payout Ratio 1981 0.329 0.445 0.093 0.274 0.470 
Firm Age 2098 91.988 47.744 57.000 95.000 120.000 
Dividend Yield 2097 0.022 0.030 0.010 0.019 0.030 
Capital Expenditures (millions) 2016 1340 2093 141.8 383.0 1262 
Stock Return, Prior Year 1980 0.077 11.32% -16.02% 5.146% 23.769% 
Stock Repurchases (millions) 2518 651.1 2097 0 81.34 530.5 
Stock Issuances (millions) 2518 324.2 1970 14.03 53.00 181.8 
Executive Compensation Values             
Actuarial Pension Value (000s) 8399 3712.406 5948.766 720.460 1817.080 4139.280 
Pension*/Asset Size 8213 0.729 1.384 0.103 0.319 0.770 
Pension/Asset Size, Industry Adj. 8213 0.000 1.328 -0.618 -0.198 0.057 
Salary and Bonus*/Asset Size 8708 0.926 2.726 0.064 0.232 0.691 
Option Value*/Asset Size 8708 0.342 1.007 0.017 0.079 0.301 
Stock Grant Value*/Asset Size 8708 0.584 2.341 0.029 0.093 0.268 
Executive Age 6667 53.814 6.022 50.000 54.000 58.000 
M 6311 0.023 0.039 0.015 0.017 0.020 
Compensation Leverage Variables             
CEO-Level 8373 0.183 0.181 0.041 0.129 0.270 
CEO-Level Industry Adjusted 8955 0.000 0.208 -0.157 -0.054 0.106 
Firm-Level 1929 0.207 0.182 0.066 0.164 0.295 
Firm-Level Industry Adjusted 1929 0.000 0.180 -0.137 -0.054 0.087 
Dummy Variables             
Liquidity Constraint 2121 0.016 
    Tax Loss  2121 0.756 
    *Scaled by 1,000 for display purposes. 
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Table 2: Industry Descriptive Statistics 
Two digit SIC codes obtained from Compustat. N refers to the number of firms in that industrial category. Average dividend 
payout ratio is defined as the average of (dividends paid to shareholders/ income available for distribution to shareholders) 
for each industry.  
Industry SIC N 
% of 
Total 
Average Dividend 
Yield 
Average Dividend 
Payout Ratio 
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 01-09 1 0.37% 0.007 0.513 
Construction 15-17 1 0.37% 0.010 0.314 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 60-67 47 17.28% 0.010 1.300 
Manufacturing 20-39 130 47.79% 0.020 0.409 
Mining 10-14 15 5.51% 0.029 -0.457 
Nonclassifiable Establishments 99 2 0.74% 0.014 0.490 
Retail Trade 52-59 13 4.78% 0.010 0.194 
Services 70-89 12 4.41% 0.025 0.206 
Transportation & Public Utilities 40-49 46 16.91% 0.006 0.601 
Wholesale Trade 50-51 5 1.84% 0.018 4.240 
Total Firms   272 100.00%    
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Table 3: Regressions of Firm Dividend Yield on Compensation Leverage and Pension Size 
This table uses the dividend yield from equations (4) and both firm-level and CEO-level data.  Regression is OLS with robust 
standard errors. Dividend Yield is defined as the value of the annual dividend per share divided by the stock. We test pension 
effects using four different independent variables: industry-adjusted compensation leverage and scaled actuarial pension value 
for aggregate executive data at the firm level, and the same two variables using CEO data alone. Other independent variables 
are salbonusassets, salary and bonus compensation for managers scaled by firm asset size; optionassets; option award value 
scaled by firm asset size; firmsize the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm at year end; debtequity firm debt 
divided by firm equity; dtd distance-to-default, as calculated using the methodology explained in Appendix B; firmage the age 
of the firm; liq_cons and tax dummy variables representing whether the firm reported a negative income or a net operating loss 
carryover during that firm year; capx are capital expenditures during the year; stockreturn is the return of the firm’s stock over 
the previous year; cashflowoperations is the cash flow from operations in the prior year; and mktbook is the market to book 
ratio. The sample contains 1,596 and 1,507 firm-years representing data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009. Reported 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation following Rogers (1993). 
  Dependent Variable: Dividend Yield  
 CEO Level Firm Level 
Independent Variable 
Compensation Leverage 
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry Adjusted 
Compensation Leverage 
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry Adjusted 
 
 
 
  
Comp_lvg -3.1244*** 
 
-3.2055***  
 
(-7.28) 
 
(-8.70)  
pensionassets  -0.0492*  -0.0466 
 
 (-2.09)  (-1.74) 
salbonusassets 0.0011 0.0073*** 0.0005 0.0063** 
 
(1.47) (4.02) (0.40)  (2.54) 
optionsassets 0.0143* 0.0190** 0.0115 0.01701** 
 
(2.23) (2.72) (1.70)  (2.48) 
firmsize 0.0592 0.0703 -0.1326 -0.0444 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (-0.79) (-0.22) 
debtequity -0.0224*** -0.0022** -0.2310 -0.5281** 
 
(-4.23) (-2.51) (-1.56) (-2.88) 
dtd -0.2635*** -0.2643*** -0.2668*** -0.2888*** 
 
(-5.86) (-4.93) (-8.00) (-7.88) 
firmage -0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0018* -0.0021* 
 
(-1.75) (-1.81) (-2.07) (-1.94) 
liq_cons 0.8210*** -0.4531** 0.8040 0.2639 
 
(3.71) (3.05) (1.79)  (0.51)  
tax 0.0201 0.0006 0.1799** 0.2066** 
 
(0.53) (0.01) (2.30)  (2.54)  
capx -0.0008* -0.0006* -0.0005 -0.0004 
 (-1.89) (-1.84) (-1.39) (-1.65) 
stockreturn 0.5143* 0.7136* 0.5696*** 0.7694*** 
 (1.98) (1.92) (3.81) (4.00) 
cashflowOperations 0.0002* 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0009 
 (1.87) (0.78) (0.77) (-0.07) 
marketbook 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.29) (-0.55) (-0.03) (-1.02) 
     
Pseudo-R Squared 0.2168 0.1284 0.2540 0.1649 
Observations 1611 1518 1535 1448 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4: 2SLS Regressions of Firm Dividend Yield on Compensation Leverage and 
Pension Size 
This table uses the dividend yield from equations (4) and both firm-level and CEO-level data.  Dividend Yield is defined 
as the value of the annual dividend per share divided by the stock. Regression is 2SLS with instrumental variables ‘M’, a 
multiplier factor equivalent to the percentage of pension benefit for each dollar of compensation earned, and executive 
age during the sample firm year. We test pension effects using four different independent variables: industry-adjusted 
compensation leverage and scaled actuarial pension value for aggregate executive data at the firm level, and the same two 
variables using CEO data alone. Other independent variables are salbonusassets, salary and bonus compensation for 
managers scaled by firm asset size; optionassets; option award value scaled by firm asset size; firmsize the natural log of 
the market capitalization of the firm at year end; debtequity firm debt divided by firm equity; dtd distance-to-default, as 
calculated using the methodology explained in Appendix B; firmage the age of the firm; liq_cons and tax dummy 
variables representing whether the firm reported a negative income or a net operating loss carryover during that firm year; 
capx are capital expenditures during the year; stockreturn is the return of the firm’s stock over the previous year; 
cashflowoperations is the cash flow from operations in the prior year; and mktbook is the market to book ratio. The 
sample represents data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009. Reported standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation following Rogers (1993). 
 
Dependent Variable: Dividend Yield 
 CEO Level Firm Level 
Independent Variable 
Compensation Leverage  
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry Adjusted 
Compensation Leverage 
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry Adjusted 
     Comp_lvg -3.3797*** 
 
-3.8465***  
 
(-3.53) 
 
(-4.40)  
pensionassets 
 
-0.3466***  -1.1143*** 
  
(-3.12)  (-3.99) 
salbonusassets -0.0019 0.0146*** -0.0472*** 0.0367** 
 
(-1.31) (4.53) (-2.80) (2.20) 
optionsassets 0.0153** 0.0285* 0.01536** 0.03314 
 
(2.07) (1.80) (2.32)  (1.26) 
firmsize -0.1175 -0.1744 -0.12082 -0.3401** 
 
(-0.15) (-0.10) (-0.51) (-2.35) 
debtequity -0.0329 -0.0466 -0.22617 -0.2784 
 
(-1.33) (-1.38) (-0.97) (-1.03) 
dtd -0.2252*** -0.2068** -0.19753*** -0.1746*** 
 
(-3.96) (-2.36) (-4.40) (-2.73) 
firmage -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.00226 0.0057 
 
(-0.45) (-0.91) (-0.14) (0.46) 
liq_cons 0.9894*** 0.7886*** 1.00457 0.2981 
 
(2.81) (3.47) (1.41) (0.40) 
tax -0.0035 -0.1408 0.13158 -0.0656 
 
(-0.51) (-0.13) (0.86) (-0.62) 
capx -0.0006* -0.0006** 0.0003 -0.0006 
 (-1.69) (-2.54) (0.10) (-0.23) 
stockreturn 0.6343** 0.7797* 0.8471*** 0.8021*** 
 (1.97) (1.67) (3.67) (4.35) 
cashflowOperations 0.0002* -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002* 
 (1.67) (-0.58) (-0.48) (-1.74) 
marketbook -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.20) (-0.51) (-0.82) (0.15) 
     
Instrument Variables Executive Age; M Executive Age; M Executive Age; M Executive Age; M 
Observations 1062 1062 995 991 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5: Regressions of Firm Payout Ratio on Compensation Leverage and Pension Size 
This table presents the Tobit regression results derived from equation (5) with robust standard errors. The dependent variable 
for each of these regressions is the Payout Ratio, defined as the ratio of dividends paid to income available to shareholders for 
a given firm-year. We test pension effects using four different independent variables: industry-adjusted compensation leverage 
and scaled actuarial pension value for aggregate executive data at the firm level, and the same two variables using CEO data 
alone. Additional independent variables include salbonus  salary and bonus compensation for managers scaled by firm asset 
size; options; option award value scaled by firm asset size; dividend refers to the number of cash dividends declared during the 
year; ln(income) refers to the log of the income available to common shareholders; leverage refers to the firms’ long-term debt 
divided by equity for the year; mktbook is the market value of firms’ common shares divided by shareholders’ equity; capx are 
capital expenditures during the year; beta refers to the monthly fundamental beta reported by Compustat; firmsize is the natural 
log of the firm’s market value; stockreturn is the return of the firm’s stock over the previous year; and cashflowoperations is 
the cash flow from operations in the prior year. The sample contains between 1,430 and 1,644 firm-years representing data on 
272 firms over the period 2000-2009. Reported standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
following Rogers (1993).  
 
Dependent Variable: Payout Ratio 
 Independent Variable: CEO Level Firm Level 
 
Compensation Leverage  
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry Adjusted 
Compensation Leverage 
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry 
Adjusted 
comp_lvg -3.742*** 
 
-2.3947 *** 
 
 
(-8.37) 
 
(-7.91) 
 
pensionassets 
 
-0.2878*** 
 
-0.2804*** 
  
(-6.20) 
 
(-4.32)  
salbonus -0.01289*** -0.0058* -0.0027* -0.0026 
 
(-8.06) (-1.87) (-1.75) (-0.82)  
options 0.0254*** 0.0260*** 0.0102 0.0222** 
 
(3.61) (3.77) (1.52) (2.37)  
dividend 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
 
(5.05) (4.90) (5.49) (5.12) 
ln(income) -3.4808*** -3.4485*** -3.0938*** -3.1824*** 
 
(-16.76) (-16.02) (-16.83) (-16.66)  
leverage -0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0296* -0.0289* 
 
(-0.66) (-1.34) (-1.82) (-1.74) 
mktbook 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0193* 0.0186* 
 
(-4.40) (-3.37) (1.81) (1.68) 
capx 0.0001 0.0002 0.0009 0.0008 
 
(1.64) (1.59) (1.23) (1.11) 
beta 0.4132 0.4168 -0.1553 -0.2168 
 
(1.53)  (1.62) (-0.99) (-1.36)  
firmsize 4.247*** 4.0052*** 3.8689*** 3.8129*** 
 
(12.62) (10.22) (13.16) (11.83) 
stockreturn -0.8916** -0.7652** -0.0708*** -0.0621*** 
 (-2.61) (-2.16) (-5.29) (-8.26) 
cashflowoperations 0.0004 0.0005* 0.0003 -0.0004 
 (1.47) (1.71) (1.39) (1.64) 
Pseudo-R Squared 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.017 
Observations 1502 1430 1644 1544 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6: 2SLS Regressions of Firm Payout Ratio on Compensation Leverage and Pension 
Size 
This table uses the dividend yield from equation (5) and both firm-level and CEO-level data.  Regression is 2SLS with 
instrumental variables ‘M’, a multiplier factor equivalent to the percentage of pension benefit for each dollar of compensation 
earned, and executive age during the sample firm year. We test pension effects using four different independent variables: 
industry-adjusted compensation leverage and scaled actuarial pension value for aggregate executive data at the firm level, and 
the same two variables using CEO data alone. Additional independent variables include salbonus  salary and bonus 
compensation for managers scaled by firm asset size; options; option award value scaled by firm asset size; dividend refers to 
the number of cash dividends declared during the year; ln(income) refers to the log of the income available to common 
shareholders; leverage refers to the firms’ long-term debt divided by equity for the year; mktbook is the market value of firms’ 
common shares divided by shareholders’ equity; capx are capital expenditures during the year; beta refers to the monthly 
fundamental beta reported by Compustat; firmsize is the natural log of the firm’s market value; stockreturn is the return of the 
firm’s stock over the previous year; and cashflowoperations is the cash flow from operations in the prior year. The sample 
represents data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009. Reported standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation following Rogers (1993). 
 
Dependent Variable: Payout Ratio 
Independent Variable: CEO Level Firm Level 
 Compensation Leverage  
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry Adjusted 
Compensation Leverage 
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry Adjusted 
comp_lvg -5.5174*** 
 
-7.1505 
 
 
(-3.24) 
 
(-1.08) 
 pensionassets 
 
-0.5817*  -0.4870 
  
(-1.77)  (-1.18) 
salbonus -0.2533*** -0.0538 -0.0963 0.1003 
 
(-4.70) (0.97) (-1.13) (1.11) 
options 0.1209*** 0.1917 -0.0436 0.1038 
 
(3.20) (1.21) (-0.40) (0.87) 
dividend 0.0025*** 0.0016* 0.0033 0.0014 
 
(2.98) (1.73) (1.34) (1.43) 
ln(income) -7.1791** -5.4134** -6.3727 -5.3005 
 
(-2.48) (-2.42) (-1.61) (-1.56) 
leverage -0.0638** -0.2788*** -0.0079 -0.3295 
 
(-2.20) (-8.55) (-0.32) (-1.38) 
mktbook -0.0004*** 0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0002 
 
(-3.68) (2.07) (-0.24) (-0.09) 
capx 0.0007** 0.0003*** 0.0008 0.0002** 
 
(2.02) (9.19) (1.25) (2.19) 
beta 0.7769*** 1.8321** -0.4702 -0.2741 
 
(4.16) (2.26) (0.63) (-0.60) 
firmsize 6.5197* 2.7233** 0.8021* 3.8984* 
 
(1.79) (2.54) (1.82) (1.74) 
stockreturn -4.3354*** -1.6092 -0.3201 -1.0830** 
 
(-3.77) (-1.53) (-1.25) (-2.46) 
cashflowoperations -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0005 
 (-1.45) (1.18) (-0.81) (0.86) 
     
Instrument Variables Executive Age; M Executive Age; M Executive Age; M Executive Age; M 
Observations 913 913 1067 1062 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7: Regressions of Firm Net Stock Repurchases on Compensation Leverage and 
Pension Size 
This table examines cash flow decisions made by a firm via a dividend and net stock repurchase model. The dependent 
variable, [Dividends - (Repurchases – Issuances)]/Assets is analyzed using both firm-level and CEO-level data.  
Regression is OLS with robust standard errors. We test pension effects using four different independent variables: 
industry-adjusted compensation leverage and scaled actuarial pension value for aggregate executive data at the firm 
level, and the same two variables using CEO data alone. Other independent variables are salbonusassets, salary and 
bonus compensation for managers scaled by firm asset size; optionassets; option award value scaled by firm asset size; 
firmsize the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm at year end; debtequity firm debt divided by firm equity; 
dtd distance-to-default, as calculated using the methodology explained in Appendix B; firmage the age of the firm; liq-
_cons and tax dummy variables representing whether the firm reported a negative income or a net operating loss 
carryover during that firm year; capx are capital expenditures during the year; stockreturn is the return of the firm’s 
stock over the previous year; cashflowoperations is the cash flow from operations in the prior year; and mktbook is the 
market to book ratio. The sample representing data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009.   Reported standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation following Rogers (1993). 
 
Dependent Variable: [Dividends - (Repurchases – Issuances)]/Assets 
 CEO Level Firm Level 
Independent Variable 
Compensation Leverage  
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry Adjusted 
Compensation Leverage 
Industry Adjusted 
Pension/Assets 
 Industry Adjusted 
     Comp_lvg 0.0872 
 
0.1776*  
 
(1.61) 
 
(1.87)  
pensionassets 
 
-0.0960**  -0.0825** 
  
(-2.94)  (-2.34) 
salbonusassets 0.0004 0.0012** 0.0012* 0.0017* 
 
(1.76) (2.59) (1.94) (2.17) 
optionsassets -0.0165*** -0.0050*** -0.0212*** -0.0213*** 
 
(-5.58) (-5.75) (-6.05) (-6.50) 
firmsize 0.0281 -0.0519 0.0986 0.0324 
 
(1.50) (-0.01) (1.65) (1.11) 
debtequity 0.0113 0.0374 -0.0153 -0.0220 
 
(-0.92) (-1.05) (-1.07) (-1.20) 
dtd -0.0351 -0.0246 0.0086 0.0099 
 
(0.81) (0.92) (1.22) (1.20) 
firmage -0.0003 0.0001* 0.0043 0.0006* 
 
(1.09) (2.16) (1.69) (2.08) 
liq_cons 0.0620 0.1240 0.0824 0.0803 
 
(0.82) (0.86) (1.76) (1.65) 
tax 0.2634*** 0.2717** 0.1651** 0.1577** 
 
(3.37) (3.09) (3.22) (3.09) 
capx 0.0002 0.0008* 0.0005** 0.0007** 
 
(1.79) (2.07) (2.76) (2.68) 
stockreturn 0.1199 0.0931 0.0934 0.0565 
 (0.93) (0.65) (1.16) (1.04) 
cashflowOperations -0.0001** -0.0009** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** 
 (-3.06) (-2.98) (-4.15) (-3.41) 
marketbook -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (-0.26) (-0.38) (-1.44) (-0.96) 
     
R Squared 0.1241 0.1464 0.1380 0.1542 
Observations 1241 1210 1335 1264 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table  8: Regressions of Firm Dividend Yield by Funding Status at the CEO Level 
This table uses the dividend yield and CEO-level data.   Dividend Yield is defined as the value of the annual dividend per 
share divided by the stock. Regression is OLS with robust standard errors. We test pension effects using four different 
independent variables: two regressions using industry-adjusted compensation leverage from both funded and unfunded plans, 
and two regressions from industry-adjusted, asset-scaled actuarial pension values also divided into funded and unfunded plans. 
The regressions use CEO-specific executive compensation data. Other independent variables are salbonusassets, salary and 
bonus compensation for managers scaled by firm asset size; optionassets; option award value scaled by firm asset size; 
firmsize the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm at year end; debtequity firm debt divided by firm equity; dtd 
distance-to-default, as calculated using the methodology explained in Appendix B; firmage the age of the firm; liq_cons and 
tax dummy variables representing whether the firm reported a negative income or a net operating loss carryover during that 
firm year; capx are capital expenditures during the year; stockreturn is the return of the firm’s stock over the previous year; 
cashflowoperations is the cash flow from operations in the prior year; and mktbook is the market to book ratio. The sample 
contains between 354 and 1,225 firm-years representing data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009.  Reported standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation following Rogers (1993). 
 
Dependent Variable: Dividend Yield 
Independent Variable 
Comp. Leverage 
Funded Pensions 
Comp. Leverage 
Unfunded Pensions 
Pension/Assets 
Funded Pensions 
Pension/Assets 
Unfunded Pensions 
     comp_lvg -2.0881*** -3.2801*** 
  
 
(-3.62) (-7.46) 
  pensionassets 
  
0.0297 -0.1234*** 
   
(0.80) (-3.17) 
salbonusassets 0.0040 0.0003 -0.0040 0.0081** 
 
(0.99) (0.10) (0.96) (2.33) 
optionsassets 0.0199* 0.0110 0.0226* 0.0180 
 
(2.16) (1.41) (2.18) (1.64) 
firmsize -0.1631 -0.0689 -0.2843 -0.0642 
 
(-0.69) (-0.66) (-1.03) (-0.31) 
debtequity -0.0226 -0.0290** 0.0132 -0.0339 
 
(-0.39) (-2.77) (-0.03) (-1.06) 
dtd -0.2976*** -0.2525*** -0.3447*** -0.2318*** 
 
(-5.79) (-5.26) (-7.94) (-3.72) 
firmage -0.0084*** -0.0011 -0.0087*** -0.0015 
 
(-6.72) (-0.74) (-6.74) (-0.94) 
liq_cons 0.7865* 0.8296 1.089** 0.1987 
 
(1.90) (1.54) (2.55) (0.48) 
tax 0.3447** -0.1442 0.4238*** -0.2127 
 
(2.50) (-0.84) (3.66) (-1.16) 
capx -0.0006 -0.0010* -0.0006 -0.0007 
 -(0.14) (-1.98) (-0.12) (-1.57) 
stockreturn 0.0263 0.6814*** 0.2306 0.9183*** 
 (0.25) (5.80) (1.29) (4.97) 
cashflowOperations -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 
 (-0.04) (1.56) (-0.66) (0.79) 
mktbook -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0001 
 (-0.58) (0.37) (-0.23) (1.18) 
     
R-squared 0.2969 0.2248 0.2983 0.1217 
Observations 379 1225 354 1157 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table  9: Regressions of Firm Dividend Yield by Funding Status at the Firm Level 
This table uses the dividend yield at the firm-level by aggregating data from both CEOs and non-CEO executives.  Regression 
is OLS with robust standard errors.  Dividend Yield is defined as the value of the annual dividend per share divided by the 
stock. We test pension effects using four different independent variables: two regressions using industry-adjusted 
compensation leverage from both funded and unfunded plans, and two regressions from industry-adjusted, asset-scaled 
actuarial pension values also divided into funded and unfunded plans. All regressions use aggregate ‘top’ executive data at the 
firm level. Other independent variables are salbonusassets, salary and bonus compensation for managers scaled by firm asset 
size; optionassets; option award value scaled by firm asset size; firmsize the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm 
at year end; debtequity firm debt divided by firm equity; dtd distance-to-default, as calculated using the methodology 
explained in Appendix B; firmage the age of the firm; liq_cons and tax dummy variables representing whether the firm 
reported a negative income or a net operating loss carryover during that firm year; capex p are capital expenditures during the 
year; stockreturn is the return of the firm’s stock over the previous year; cashflowoperations is the cash flow from operations 
in the prior year; and mktbook is the market to book ratio. The sample contains 177 and 887 firm-years representing data on 
272 firms over the period 2000-2009.  Reported standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
following Rogers (1993). 
 
Dependent Variable: Dividend Yield 
Independent Variable 
Comp. Leverage 
Funded Pensions 
Comp. Leverage 
Unfunded Pensions 
Pension/Assets 
Funded Pensions 
Pension/Assets 
Unfunded Pensions 
     comp_lvg -2.3541*** -3.4898*** 
  
 
(-3.74) (-8.37) 
  pensionassets 
  
-0.1846 -0.0720 
   
(-1.04) (-1.55) 
salbonusassets 0.0012 -0.0006 0.0138 0.0070* 
 
(0.51) (-0.24) (1.33) (1.87) 
optionsassets 0.0956*** 0.0071 0.0987*** 0.02026* 
 
(5.22) (0.90) (7.01) (1.45) 
firmsize -0.6540* -0.0211 0.4936 0.00343 
 
(2.01) (0.11) (1.54) (0.84) 
debtequity 0.2191 -0.3491 -0.2847 -0.69642** 
 
(-0.93) (-1.63) (-0.63) (-2.71) 
dtd -0.2331*** -0.2140*** -0.2792*** -0.20983*** 
 
(-4.38) (-4.75) (-4.58) (-3.59) 
firmage -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0027 -0.00155 
 
(0.47) (-1.03) (0.94) (-1.82) 
liq_cons 0.1546 0.8102 0.5787** 0.82177 
 
(0.94) (1.04) (2.83) (0.69) 
tax 0.3891 -0.0379 0.3341 -0.0390 
 
(1.53) (-0.31) (1.14) (-0.31) 
capx 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0008* 
 (1.41) (-1.37) (1.64) (-2.11) 
stockreturn 0.0034 0.7743*** 0.2720 1.0630*** 
 (0.01) (4.80) (0.75) (5.56) 
cashflowOperations 0.0001** 0.0003* -0.0006** 0.0008 
 (-2.67) (1.98) (-2.79) (1.15) 
mktbook 0.0006*** 0.0003 -0.0008*** 0.0002 
 (-4.77) (0.05) (-3.54) (0.04) 
     
R-squared 0.3061 0.2748 0.2695 0.1831 
Observations 185 887 177 828 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10: Regressions of Pension Funding Status on the Payout Ratio at the CEO Level 
This table presents the Tobit regression results derived from equation (5) with robust standard errors. The dependent variable 
for each of these regressions is the Dividend Payout Ratio, defined as the ratio of dividends paid to income available to 
shareholders for a given firm-year. We test pension effects using four different independent variables: industry-adjusted 
compensation leverage and scaled actuarial pension value for aggregate executive data at the firm level, and the same two 
variables using CEO data alone. Additional independent variables include salbonus  salary and bonus compensation for 
managers scaled by firm asset size; options; option award value scaled by firm asset size; dividend refers to the number of 
cash dividends declared during the year; ln(income) refers to the log of the income available to common shareholders; 
leverage refers to the firms’ long-term debt divided by equity for the year; mktbook is the market value of firms’ common 
shares divided by shareholders’ equity; capx are capital expenditures during the year; beta refers to the monthly fundamental 
beta reported by Compustat; firmsize is the natural log of the firm’s market value; stockreturn is the return of the firm’s stock 
over the previous year; and cashflowoperations is the cash flow from operations in the prior year. The sample contains 
between 291 and 1,031 firm-years representing data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009. Reported standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation following Rogers (1993). 
 
Dependent Variable: Payout Ratio 
 Independent Variable: CEO Level 
 
Comp. Leverage 
Funded Pensions 
Comp. Leverage 
Unfunded Pensions 
Pension/Assets 
Funded Pensions 
Pension/Assets 
Unfunded 
Pensions 
comp_lvg 0.1626** -6.1427*** 
  
 
(2.02) (-9.80) 
  
pensionassets 
 
 -0.0013 -0.8802*** 
  
 (-0.07) (-3.70) 
salbonus -0.0018*** -0.0219*** -0.0021*** -0.0050 
 
(-4.19) (-7.11) (-3.97) (-0.10)  
options -0.0056*** 0.0641*** -0.0062*** 0.0969*** 
 
(-2.98) (3.86) (-3.11) (2.99)  
dividend 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0009*** 
 
(6.44) (4.03) (6.07) (3.84) 
ln(income) -0.1517*** -4.7780*** -0.1696*** -4.6329*** 
 
(-8.88) (-15.73) (-9.58) (-14.45)  
leverage -0.0123*** -0.0028 -0.0077 -0.0105 
 
(-6.61) (-0.41) (-1.36) (-1.44) 
mktbook -0.0004 -0.0005** -0.0003 -0.0004 
 
(-0.54) (-2.05) (-0.39) (-1.73) 
capx 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008 0.0001 
 
(0.37) (0.79) (1.06) (0.84) 
beta -0.0888** -0.2356 -0.1251*** 0.3106 
 
(-2.30)  (0.67) (-2.72) (0.90)  
firmsize 0.2761*** 5.3788*** 0.3090*** 4.7953*** 
 
(8.74) (10.12) (6.87) (8.20) 
stockreturn -0.1259*** -1.2977** -0.1598*** -1.0282 
 (-3.30) (-2.01) (-3.24) (-1.43) 
cashflowoperations -0.0002*** 0.0005 -0.0002*** -0.0004 
 (-7.72) (0.99) (-4.29) (1.23) 
     
Observations 317 1031 291 996 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 11: Regressions of Pension Funding Status on the Payout Ratio at the Firm Level 
This table presents the Tobit regression results derived from equation (5) with robust standard errors. The dependent variable 
for each of these regressions is the Payout Ratio, defined as the ratio of dividends paid to income available to shareholders for 
a given firm-year. We test pension effects using four different independent variables: industry-adjusted compensation leverage 
and scaled actuarial pension value for aggregate executive data at the firm level, and the same two variables using CEO data 
alone. Additional independent variables include salbonus  salary and bonus compensation for managers scaled by firm asset 
size; options; option award value scaled by firm asset size; dividend refers to the number of cash dividends declared during the 
year; ln(income) refers to the log of the income available to common shareholders; leverage refers to the firms’ long-term debt 
divided by equity for the year; mktbook is the market value of firms’ common shares divided by shareholders’ equity; capx are 
capital expenditures during the year; beta refers to the monthly fundamental beta reported by Compustat; firmsize is the 
natural log of the firm’s market value; stockreturn is the return of the firm’s stock over the previous year; and 
cashflowoperations is the cash flow from operations in the prior year.  The sample contains between 312 and 1,087 firm-years 
representing data on 272 firms over the period 2000-2009. Reported standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation following Rogers (1993). 
 
Dependent Variable: Payout Ratio 
 Independent Variable: Firm Level 
 
Comp. Leverage 
Funded Pensions 
Comp. Leverage 
Unfunded Pensions 
Pension/Assets 
Funded Pensions 
Pension/Assets 
Unfunded 
Pensions 
comp_lvg 0.1599* -3.3608*** 
  
 
(1.96) (-7.49) 
  
pensionassets 
 
 -0.2495 -0.1341*** 
  
 (-1.41) (-4.70) 
salbonus 0.0002** -0.0031 0.0026 -0.0026*** 
 
(2.34) (-1.41) (0.30) (-3.25) 
options -0.0042*** 0.0098 0.0696** 0.0075*** 
 
(-4.60) (1.10) (2.52) (3.73)  
dividend 0.0001*** 0.0009*** 0.0022*** 0.0003*** 
 
(5.58) (4.33) (3.80) (4.24) 
ln(income) -0.0405 -3.8623*** -1.1169*** -1.1797*** 
 
(-1.34) (-22.51) (-8.75) (-20.41)  
leverage -0.0086** -0.0273 -1.0250** -0.0075 
 
(-2.14) (-1.44) (-2.42) (-1.55) 
mktbook -0.0063** 0.0165 0.6773** 0.0041 
 
(2.39) (1.46) (2.43) (1.22) 
capx 0.0001* 0.0004 0.0009** 0.0005** 
 
(1.85) (0.29) (2.01) (0.28) 
beta -0.1872*** 0.0001 -1.9725 0.4143 
 
(-8.15)  (0.00) (-1.56) (0.30)  
firmsize 0.0949* 4.6164*** 1.6531*** 1.4351*** 
 
(1.69) (10.68) (8.23) (9.49) 
stockreturn -0.0633** -0.0866*** -1.8489 -0.0376*** 
 (-2.06) (-6.84) (-0.96) (-8.78) 
cashflowoperations -0.0002*** 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0004 
 (-5.05) (0.02) (0.38) (1.30) 
     
Observations 379 1249 354 1184 
Year Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 12: Robustness tests 
This table subjects models (4) and (10) to several robustness tests for both CEO and firm-level aggregate manager data. 
Panel A reports the Robustness models following the results for Table 3; Panel B reports like results for Table 5.  Dividend 
Yield is defined as the value of the annual dividend per share divided by the stock. We test pension effects using four 
different independent variables: industry-adjusted compensation leverage and scaled actuarial pension value for aggregate 
executive data at the firm level, and the same two variables using CEO data alone. The ‘Raw Data’ model removes 
industry-controls from the data. ‘Robust Fixed Effects’ is a company-specific fixed effects model with robust standard 
errors. ‘Clustered Standard Errors’ uses the same model but reports cluster-correlated errors. The fourth robustness test 
follows Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with 6 annual cross-sections, and lastly we report the same models with 
Newey-West standard errors.   
  Panel A: Robustness Models for Table 3 
 Dependent Variable: Dividend Yield 
 CEO-Level Firm-Level 
Robustness Model Compensation 
Leverage Pension/Assets 
Compensation 
Leverage Pension/Assets 
  
   
Raw Data -3.124*** -0.049 -3.205*** -0.047 
 
(-13.88) (-1.54) (-14.00) (-1.50) 
Robust Fixed Effects -1.306*** -0.059* -1.269*** -0.050* 
 (-5.67) (-1.80) (-5.31) (-1.63) 
Fama-MacBeth -3.221*** -0.067** -3.295*** -0.062* 
 (-6.70) (-2.35) (-7.28) (-2.20) 
Newey-West  -3.124*** -0.049 -3.030*** -0.047 
 (-7.35) (-1.33) (-7.92) (-1.26) 
     
 Panel B: Robustness Models for Table 5 
 Dependent Variable: Payout Ratio 
 CEO-Level Firm-Level 
 
Compensation 
Leverage Pension/Assets 
Compensation 
Leverage Pension/Assets 
Raw Data -3.755*** -0.289 -2.395** -0.280* 
 (-2.86) (-0.84) (-2.05) (-1.71) 
Robust Fixed Effects -4.010** 0.333 -2.585** -0.292* 
 (-2.02) (0.69) (-2.11) (-1.76) 
Fama-MacBeth -1.8571 -0.7815 -0.839 -0.267 
 (-1.01) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.24) 
Newey-West  -5.1330 -0.5978 -2.536 -0.292 
 (-1.24) (-1.16) (-1.04) (-1.04) 
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Chapter 3: 
 
Executive Pensions and Optimal Pay Structure 
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010) create a calibrated principal-agent framework with constant 
relative risk aversion to determine the optimal structure of executive pay. They find that the 
model is particularly adept at explaining the large observed option holdings and high base 
salaries common among executives. However, their model does not take into account executive 
pensions, which have become an increasingly significant part of manager compensation. Using a 
hand-collected database of CEOs and other top executives, our research adjusts and broadens 
their model to include pension compensation.  
We recalibrated the Dittmann and Maug (2007) model to incorporate a pension variable and 
a more diverse manager database of CEOs and top executives. When we empirically tested the 
new model and compared the optimal executive contract value to the observed contract value, we 
found that the addition of the pension variable generated more viable contracts; this proved true 
for both constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and loss-aversion (LA) models. Under this 
framework, we find that most optimal executive contracts consist of lower salary and pension 
value compensation, but greater compensation in the form of options. Further, we found greater 
mispricing between observed and optimal contracts. Testing the source of this mispricing via a 
Tobit regression, we find that higher pension compensation increase the amount of contract 
‘mispricing’ between observed and optimal executive contracts.  
Pensions are consistently overlooked in most compensation models, primarily because of the 
great difficulty in determining their values accurately. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) outline a 
process to calculate annual pension entitlement using publically available financial statements. 
Since pensions are usually given with a ‘lump-sum’ option when the executive retires, pensions 
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are comparable to other types of compensation (such as options). Significant growth in actuarial 
pension value (138% between 2000 and 2009) supports the growing empirical evidence that 
pensions have become a significant factor in agency theory
13
, yet the typical lack of data 
associated with executive pensions has hindered research on this topic significantly. Prior to 
2006, pension data needed to be tediously hand collected. Yet, growth in actuarial pension values 
among the largest US firms has exceeded salary and bonus compensation by nearly threefold 
between 2000 and 2009.   
In this paper, we follow the theoretical model used by Carpenter (1998),  Bettis et. al. (2005), 
and Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) to calculate the optimal piecewise linear contract, 
comparing this theoretical result with both a matched risk-aversion model and observed data. 
Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010) conclude that their model with loss-averse agents generates 
convex compensation contracts that better resemble observed contracts than traditional risk 
aversion models. The concept of loss-aversion in principal-agent theory was previously studied 
in great detail by de Meza and Webb (2007). Their model suggests that a part of optimal 
executive compensation should be indifferent to firm performance, and this could explain the 
great significance of options. Successive research by Dittman and Muag (2007), Dittmann, 
Maug, and Spalt (2010) focus on option implications; following Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 
2007), Herweg, Müller, and Weinschenk (2010) uses a binary loss-aversion contract to 
rationalize bonuses. However, our research is the first to isolate the effect of loss-aversion 
contracts on optimal pension values. Actuarial pension values are so contractually oriented and 
insulated from changes in firm performance that they may better represent the sort of 
‘performance insensitive compensation’ than options. Further, the application of a loss-aversion 
                                                          
13
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed that managers should be compensated in a way that mimics the optimal 
capital structure of a firm; Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that compensating managers heavily with pensions 
make their firms more risk-adverse.  
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executive compensation model is an important consideration in the principal-agent theory 
surrounding pensions. Increasing empirical evidence supports the idea that higher pension 
compensation among executives corresponds to lower firm risk, lower dividends, and 
underinvestment
14
.  By modeling executive compensation in this manner, we provide the first 
application of a loss-aversion optimal compensation model on the actuarial size of pensions.   
Section 2 presents the theoretical background of our work, Section 3 considers the empirical 
technique, Section 4 discusses the hand collected data, in Section 5 we explain our results, and 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
The relationship between executive compensation and shareholders can be described via the 
traditional principal-agent framework. In this example, shareholders, acting as risk-neutral 
principals, offer the risk and effort-averse manager a contract. 
15
 The contract that is ultimately 
accepted balances the needs of the shareholders (greatest increase in value for lowest cost) with 
those of executives (highest possible compensation for least effort).  
Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010) sought to explain the significance of stock options in 
executive compensation by creating a procedure that assumes that managers’ preferences exhibit 
loss aversion.
16
 More precisely, the choices managers make under risk have three major 
characteristics: first, reference dependence, where managers value wealth levels relative to a 
                                                          
14
 See Sundaram and Yermack (2007), White (2013), and Eisdorfer et. al. (2013) 
15
 Following Dittman and Maug (2007), the researchers assume that the manager (in their paper, the CEO) 
consumes only at the end of period time T. Leverage is not considered, and the researchers do not distinguish 
between market value of equity and market value of the firm.  
16
 Loss aversion has been previously described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in ‘prospect theory’, and further 
applied in Tversky and Kahneman (1991, 1992).  
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benchmark and not the actual final wealth level; second, loss aversion, where managers regard 
losses with greater significance than gains of equal size; and third, diminishing sensitivity, where 
managers become increasingly less sensitive to incremental losses and gains with time. The 
researchers develop and calibrate a loss agent model that seeks the optimal contract for 
shareholders using the principal-agent framework. 
Following the procedure outlined by Dittmann and Maug (2007), we begin with a model of 
constant relative risk aversion where: 
 
 (  )   
  
   
   
 
(1) 
 
Here,   denotes wealth at time T and   is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. When   =1, 
 (  )     (  ). The researchers develop the optimal contract,  
 
  
     {(         )
 
   } 
(2) 
where    is the end-of-period value of the firm and   is a small number. Using Holmström 
(1979), the research follows the principal-agent framework of finance literature. Since the 
principals cannot observe the effort level of the manager directly, the contract is assumed to be a 
function of    instead of effort.  
Dittmann and Muag (2007) assumes that all eligible contracts that consist of fixed salary 
 , stock   , and stock options   . The wage function becomes:  
    (    ) 
       
                   (3) 
 
   refers to the private (non-firm) CEO wealth, K is the strike price (for the whole company), T 
refers to the maturity, and    refers to the risk free rate. The model assumes that the CEO invests 
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their non-firm wealth at the risk free rate, and that base pay (including bonus) is paid out today 
and invested.  
However, the Dittmann and Muag (2007) paper omits the actuarial value of pensions, 
which as a significant factor in executive compensation need to also be considered. The solution 
we propose is adding the factor   to represent the pension value for the given time T.  In this 
situation, the slightly amended equation becomes: 
    (    ) 
       
                     (4) 
 
Since   reflects a value determined by the supplemental executive retirement plan contract, it is 
not considered dependent on the lognormal distribution firm value, and will not be reinvested by 
the executive at the risk-free rate. Growth of the actuarial value of the pension is determined by 
factors inherent in the supplemental executive retirement contract: average of prior years’ salary 
and the computational factor m. The value ‘m’ refers to the percentage contribution per both 
salary and bonus compensation ( ) and years of experience.  
 Under this metric, as the executive gains one additional year of experience, his actuarial 
pension value should increase by this percentage annually. While no contractual changes take 
place, the explosive growth in pension value (9.06% annually) far exceeds the average 
percentage increase for each additional year of experience (1.70% annually). The bulk of this 
increase is due to increases in the executives’ averaged salary over prior years: for every year 
they remain a company executive, their ‘averaged pay’ used to calculate pension entitlement 
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increases significantly, especially due to prior promotions. To simplify, we use only the actuarial 
pension value since this incorporates all of these factors into its calculation.
17
 
 In regards to option compensation, Oyer and Shaefer (2005) identify that the risk associated 
with stock options make them inherently more expensive than other forms of compensation, 
especially comparing diversified investors with undiversified investors. A CEO awarded a $100 
in options will likely regard them as being only worth a fraction of that amount de facto due to 
the associated risk, creating ‘participation constraint’. Secondly, Hall and Murphy (2000) 
observe that stock options are fairly cheap for companies to issue relative to other forms of other 
compensation, ostensibly to save money on compensation costs while providing comparable 
executive incentives – creating an ‘incentive compatibility constraint’.  
 Keeping these constraints in mind, the objective is to solve for the optimal contract that 
addresses the principal-agent conflict under these constraints. With the addition of the pension 
variable, our constraint only is that the pension input is greater than or equal to zero. To solve the 
optimal contract, the procedure first applied by Grossman and Hart (1983) and Dittmann and 
Maug (2007) is used. With our additional pension variable, the pay of the executive in currency 
units of time T is: 
      
                         (5) 
 
Since      
        and the present value of the expected pay is        
      , our 
revised executive pay formula simplifies to: 
                   (6) 
 
                                                          
17
 Years of experience,  m, and averaged salary and bonus compensation are the most significant inputs to 
establishing actuarial present value of the pension, and are therefore endogenous to the   variable and 
unnecessary to represent separately. For an explanation of how pension value is calculated, see the ‘data’ section.  
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where the Black-Scholes option value is denoted BS. The objective of the shareholders in our 
example is to determine, as the principals, the lowest costs associated with the executives’ 
selected level of effort  ̅. Thus, our reworking of the Dittmann and Maug formula generates the 
following series of constraints: 
    (         )                     (7) 
 
        (    ̅)   ̅ (8) 
 
  ̅           (    )          (9) 
 
               (10) 
 
        (11) 
 
In this section, we address the participation constraint (8), the incentive compatibility 
constraint (9), and the allowable constraints (10). Again following Dittmann and Maug (2007), 
we allow negative base salaries, since an executive can also ‘invest’ in securities using 
previously accrued wealth. That is, in addition to their compensation, managers have accrued 
over the history of their employment ‘wealth’. If they earned $1,000,000 dollars a year but have 
a total wealth of $5,000,000, they could (if they choose) spend $2,000,000 this year to purchase 
securities. This will be treated like a ‘negative salary’ of -$1,000,000 for the purposes of the 
calculation. Once these constraints are realized, the principals seek the optimal effort level e* 
associated with the lowest possible costs.  
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3. Empirical Methodology 
 
3.1 Theoretical Application 
To study this question empirically, we follow Dittmann and Maug to replace equation (9) 
with the first-order condition for executive utility maximization, where C refers to the convex 
cost function: 
  
  
   (    )   [
  (  )
   
]
   ( )
  
 
  ( )
  
   
(12) 
Since these have non-stochastic derivatives, we can adjust this equation to define the utility-
adjusted pay-for-performance sensitivity, or UPPS: 
 
      
 
   
   (    )   (    )     (    ) [
  (  )
   
   
   
] 
(13) 
When risk neutrality exists (γ = 0), 
  (  )
   
 = 1 for all  , and UPPS is then nothing more than 
      (  ), with N(d1) being the Black-Scholes option delta. Rewriting (12) with (13), we 
arrive at:  
  
  
   (    )       
   ( )
  
   (   )  
  ( )
  
   
(14) 
And further: 
       ( ) (14) 
 
       ( )  
   {    }   
  
   ( )
  
 
(15) 
Equation (14) demonstrates that UPPS is only dependent on the contract parameters, executive 
wealth, and risk aversion, and not the unobtainable   ( ) or  ( )functions. The function k(e) is 
observed in the data. We assume that the observed executive compensation contract reflects the 
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optimal contract size; therefore, our model must satisfy the equation so that  ( )  
    (     
    
         ( )) where ‘d’ indicates the observed contract parameters. Likewise, 
the participation constraint     (  ( 
    
    
    )   )   ̅   ( ) can be solved in similar 
fashion. The final program is as follows:  
    (         )                     
           (  (         )   )      (  ( 
    
    
    )   )  
    (              )      ( 
    
    
         ) 
                                   
(16) 
Since the coefficient of risk aversion  , is unknown, we follow precedence and use values 
between 0.1 and 20. Since the observed contract is assumed to be the optimal contract, any 
difference between the value generated by the program and the optimal value indicates either a 
poor estimation of risk aversion or a suboptimal contract. Like Dittmann and Maug, we aim to 
determine a cheaper contractual option for shareholders than the observed contract.  
To empirically test our new model, we recalibrate the existing Dittmann and Maug Matlab 
model to include a pension variable. The inputs to this model are nS, stock awards; nO, option 
compensation; φ, fixed salary and bonus compensation; ρ, pension value; W0, non-firm wealth; 
σ, stock volatility; d, the dividend rate; P0, firm value; K, strike price of a representative option; 
T, maturity level of a representative executive option; and rf, the risk-free rate. Salary, option, 
and stock compensation was collected via Execucomp; stock volatility and firm value were 
calculated. Pension values were hand-collected and calculated following the methodology of 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007); executive non-firm wealth, requiring five years of executive 
compensation data and history, was also computed and compared with publically available data 
provided by Ingolf  Dittmann. Following Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010), we map all of an 
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executive’s individual option awards for one year onto a single option with a single maturity. To 
create a single representative option for each executive, we use the relative size of each option in 
an executives’ portfolio to create a weighted average maturity value. This single weighted 
maturity is used as the proxy for the average maturity of the entire option portfolio. 
Maturity of the option (T) was determined by multiplying the weighted option maturity by 
0.7, following prior literature. The model generates four individual optimal contracts: piecewise 
linear constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and loss aversion (LA) models, and general non-
linear CRRA and LA models. To incorporate different risk-taking characteristics of the 
executives, we run the model based on seven different assumptions of risk aversion, ranging 
from 0.1 to 20. The higher the risk aversion level, the more risk averse an executive is assumed 
to be.  
 
3.2 Contract Mispricing 
In this model, optimal contracts almost always produce substantial mispricing when 
compared to the observed contract. But what drives this mispricing? In previous research, 
Eisdorfer et. al. (2013) examines the relationship that different compensation levels have with 
investment distortions, particularly pensions. Likewise, White (2012) also finds that high levels 
of pension contribute to lower dividend payout levels. The actuarial present value of pension 
compensation has increased substantially since 2000, even as salaries for CEOs and non-CEO 
executives have grown only modestly (White 2012). Since these factors have substantial agency 
costs, we propose that a major factor in contract mispricing is the value of executive pensions. 
To test our model, we employ a Tobit regression. Our objective is to determine what factors 
are responsible for the difference between the original cost of the contract and the optimal 
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contract determined via our ‘improved’ Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010) Matlab model. Our 
dependent variable, Misprice, is the absolute value of the difference between the cost of the 
optimal contract and the cost of the observed contract, scaled by contract cost. Since many 
optimal contracts are equal in cost to the observed contracts (and are therefore zero), we employ 
a Tobit regression to provide a better fit of this relationship.  
 
                                                                        
                                                           
                                             
 
(17) 
 
Our control variables include Size, firm size; SalBonus, executive salary and bonus 
compensation; Stocks, executive stock award compensation; Options, the value of option awards 
to executives, determined via Core and Guay (2002); Pension; actuarial pension value of 
executive compensation; Leverage, refers to the firms’ total debt divided by equity for the given 
year; CAPX are capital expenditures during the year, scaled by firm size; Volatility, the stock 
volatility of a particular firm for a particular year; ExcessStock, the excess annual return of the 
firm against the overall market; G-Index and E-Index, two governance indices explained in 
greater detail below; YearDummies and IndustryDummies, year and industry controls, 
respectively. The model results reflect robust standard errors. 
To control for the role of manager entrenchment in contract mispricing, we use both the 
governance framework established by Gompers et. al. (2003) and the entrenchment index 
established by Bebchuk et. al. (2009). The Gompers governance-index (“G-index”) has been 
used frequently in literature as a broad indicator of firm governance characteristics. The IRRC 
Corporate Takeover Defense Publication reported biannually on 28 variables used to calculate 
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the g-index value (24 of them unique), ranging across a wide variety of firm governance 
provisions. Firms are awarded one point each for these 24 unique characteristics; the higher the 
score, the greater the potential agency costs.    IRRC was acquired by ISS in 2005, and the 
following year collection of g-score components ceased, limiting our control sample to the years 
2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. Following precedence in Gompers et. al (2003) and Bebchuk et. al. 
(2009), we assume that the governance characteristics provided in the IRRC reports remained 
constant for each firm until the publication of the subsequent report, giving us a nearly complete 
sample from 2000 until 2006. To access to the IRRC data, we used WRDS RiskMetrics, and 
followed the procedure outlined by Gompers et. al. (2003).   
Bebchuk et. al. (2009) introduced the entrenchment index (“e-index”), a subsample 
comprised of 6 of the 24 IRRC Gompers characteristics that were found to be the significant 
drivers of firm devaluation and abnormal returns
18
. Like the g-index, the e-index awards one 
point for the presence of each governance characteristic and is readily calculable using the 
WRDS RiskMetric database.  Both indices offer a substantial control for the governance effects 
on investment distortions.   
We argue that higher pension levels will generate greater levels of contract mispricing. In 
Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010), their loss-aversion model was generally consistent with the 
observed contracts. We expect that using our recalibrated pension model will create greater 
differences between the optimal contract and the observed contract. Pension values for 
executives are a significant proportion of their compensation in our sample; however, 57% of the 
700 largest firms by market capitalization offer no executive pensions at all.  If our assumptions 
about executives and loss aversion are correct, this leads to two opposing implications: the 
existing model will demonstrate that sample pension size is justifiable, or the optimal pension 
                                                          
18
 See Bebchuck et. al. (2002) for a more detailed analysis of governance variables 
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size will be significantly smaller based on the observed number of ‘zero-pension’ firms in the 
overall market
19
. This does not in itself lead to mispricing: the optimal contract solution can 
award the equivalent dollar value of pensions to other forms of compensation (salary, stock 
awards, or option grants). However, if the difference between optimal and observed pension 
values is indeed significant, what would cause this inefficiency? Pensions, due to their 
substantial variability between firms, high growth rate
20
, and difficulty of calculation, are likely 
to be a substantial source . 
 
H1: Pension values are positively (negatively) correlated with higher (lower) contract 
mispricing.   
 
 We also anticipate a strong positive relationship between the G-Index and contract 
mispricing, since higher agency costs will generate greater compensation distortions.  
 
4. Data 
 
Our unique pension dataset reflects a hand-collected series of executive pension values from 
2000 to 2009. To determine the sample size, the 700 largest firms by US market capitalization on 
December 31, 2009 were examined: of these, 300 offered executive pensions (42%), while 290 
(41%) provided values calculable under the Sundaram and Yermack framework.  
                                                          
19
 Literature does not provide any guidance that ‘firms offering pensions’ and ‘firms not offering pensions’ should 
be treated differently in regards to optimal compensation models or executive utility preferences 
20
 Pensions increased an average of 8% annually between 2000-2009, during which period salary and bonus 
compensation among executives declined.  
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Our original dataset included 272 firms and 8,955 executive-year data points, consisting of 
2,114 CEOs-years (23.6%) and 6,851 Non-CEO executive-years (76.4%) over the period 2000-
2009. This was slightly reduced when accounting for the rest of the available data; CEOs in the 
sample averaged 56 years old and had personal compensation leverage of 0.18; non-CEO 
executives were aged 53 on average with a personal compensation leverage of 0.25.  
We reduced our sample size further, omitting firms with impartial or unclear compensation 
data, executive structure, and merging issues with stock and option data. Company financial data 
was obtained via Compustat, and stock and market values determined through CRSP. Additional 
empirical variables were provided via Execucomp. However, in our effort to remain as true as 
possible to the empirical procedure established by Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010), we required 
that the executives themselves have at least five years of calculable non-firm wealth.
21
 This 
limited our database substantially, as the calculation of non-firm wealth included complete 
execucomp data for factors such as compensation, stock awards, exercised options, changes in 
executive shareholdings, and dividend payouts. After completing the data analysis ourselves, we 
matched our dataset again the wealth data provided publicly by Ingmar Dittmann. 
Our final dataset is summarized in Table I. We report 828 total executive-years from 141 
firms between 2000 and 2008, a substantial increase over the 595 CEO-years analyzed by 
Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010). In Panels B and C, we divide our sample into 455 CEO-firm 
years and 373 non-CEO executive firm-years. Our sample of executives was particularly 
diminished in our calculations of non-firm wealth, since these individuals were much more 
difficult to track (due to frequent hiring, firing or an out-of-company promotion). For example, 
comparatively few non-CEO executives were consistently reported as one of the ‘top 5’ most 
                                                          
21
 Ingolf Dittman outlines the methodology for calculating non-firm Wealth here in the article “Estimates of 
Executive Non-Firm Wealth” accessible here: 
http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/documentation_of_wealth_estimate.pdf 
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highly compensated in the firm, especially for the five years of history required to generate an 
estimate of non-firm wealth. 
Our sample is also somewhat biased towards larger and more established firms; as a general 
rule, these have been more likely to give pension compensation to executives than newer 
companies. Compared to the Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010) sample, our data included not 
only larger-than-average firms, but a greater percentage of firms that issued dividends. 
‘Moneyness’, an indication of whether the executive options held by executives were ‘in the 
money’, was on average 94.5%, indicating that they were fairly in the money. This was still 
somewhat ‘less in the money’ than prior research, but the size and breadth of our sample years 
(2000 to 2008), as well as the strong variation among high-ranking executives is probably 
responsible for most of this difference.  In Panels B and C, the significant differences in 
compensation between CEOs and non-CEO executives are particularly visible. For CEOs, the 
high standard deviation among all compensation categories indicates a high dominance by 
several ‘power CEOs’ not found among non-CEO executives. Option values are determined by 
the procedure created by Core and Guay (2002). 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Results of our Theoretical Model 
All of our programming was accomplished via Matlab. Using the framework provided in the 
Dittmann and Maug (2007), Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010), and Dittman, Zhang, Maug, and 
Spalt (2011), we were able to rewrite the model to determine the optimal compensation contract 
using four compensation variables (salary and bonus, options, stock ownership, and pension 
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compensation) and the additional variables summarized in Table I. For each of our 828 sample 
executives, we ran the model on each of seven risk-aversion levels specified by previous 
research (γ = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 3.0, 6.0. and 20.0). The resulting models generated four optimal 
compensation contracts based on our executive inputs: piecewise-linear constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA), general non-linear CRRA, piecewise-linear loss-aversion (LA), and general 
non-linear LA.  Consistent with Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010), we found that the piecewise 
contracts were more feasible and consistently calculable than the non-linear solutions.  
In Table II, we present our results for the optimal CRRA piecewise-linear contracts. Panel A, 
including all executives, we present the median of the four output parameters of the Matlab 
model: salary, stock, option, and pension values in millions. We also include the median values 
of EU, the estimated utility, and UPPS, the utility-adjusted pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
Other than salary and bonus compensation, we find that for all levels of risk aversion, stock, 
option, and pension compensation remained small. The large number of “0.000” values is not 
indicative of these contract values equaling zero; rather, they represent small values (under 0.1% 
of company ownership, or $1,000 in the case of pensions). The total cost of the contract (‘Cost’) 
is represented on the last line on each panel.  
We find that at moderate risk aversion levels (specifically, 0.5), the difference between the 
observed and optimal contracts were greatest. For all executives, we find that the optimal 
contract assuming a risk aversion level of 0.5 would consist of $1.119 million in salary and 
bonus, option values worth approximately 0.06% of the value of the company, stock 
compensation worth 0.0001% of the company’s value, and a pension entitlement of just $107. 
The median values of the current contract for these executives includes $1.459 million in salary 
and bonus, option values worth 0.01% of the value of the company, stock compensation worth 
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0.001% of the company’s value, and a pension entitlement of $3.067 million. The main 
differences reflect much of compensation literature back to Jensen and Meckling (1976) – as a 
whole, executives are paid more salary and less options (in this case, by a factor of six) than what 
they should receive. Actual stock compensation, however, was about ten times higher in 
observed contracts than our optimal solution. Despite our careful allocation of pensions in the 
modeling, there was little justification for the large executive pensions that managers in our 
sample have received.  
Similar results were found in Panel B, CEOs. As a whole, optimal CEO contracts would 
include less salary and bonus compensation ($1.696 million vs. $1.696 million when γ=0.5) with 
modestly greater option compensation (1.8% of company value vs. 1.6% of company value). At 
the same risk aversion level of 0.5, the optimal CEO pension entitlement is $6,401, as compared 
to the $12.256 million average. Interestingly, while far below current levels, it does not differ 
substantially from pensions offered to firms in the investment banking sector (which are 
frequently well below $100,000). For non-CEO executives (Panel C), the CRRA piecewise 
model provided a different solution. Like CEOs, the median optimal contract at the 0.5 risk 
aversion level reflected a lower salary and bonus ($0.887 million vs. $1.001 million), but similar 
stock and option values. Pension values were reduced to only $21.  
Generally, we observed the following from our CRRA data: the least expensive optimal 
contracts occur when we assume mid-range levels of risk aversion. As risk aversion increases, 
stock awards increase and option awards decrease. Salary and bonus levels are particularly high 
at very low and very high levels of risk aversion. Pension values also increase substantially as 
risk aversion increases, but remain significantly below observed contracts.  
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In Table III, we report the results of the optimal loss-aversion contracts. We include all of the 
same values considered in Table I, but employ the piecewise-linear loss-aversion contract instead 
of the CRRA contract. In  Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010), they found that the LA contract 
reported generally superior results with the exception of owner-managers. In our sample, we 
have a significantly larger portion of owner managers, making our data somewhat more irregular 
than the CRRA model.  
For all executives, we find that a much less predictable relationship between contract size 
and risk aversion. After testing all 828 executives via the 7 different risk aversion levels, only 
one (when risk aversion = 1.0) reported a lower contract cost than the corresponding observed 
contract. In other words, at most risk aversion levels, the observed contracts of the executives 
were superior in cost to the optimal values. However, the nature of the contract was profoundly 
different: instead of offering the input median salary of $1.311 million, the optimal contracts 
generally supported hard compensation levels of below $1 million. Option awards were 
generally much higher - 0.009 to 0.030%, instead of the input median of 0.006%. Reconciling 
the added option valuation to the lower salary and bonus levels proved difficult for the LA 
model; most solutions with the pension factor exceeded the observed contract cost.  
 For CEOs, this was best represented in the differences between the observed contract and 
the optimal contract at γ=0.1. We observed that the CEO’s overall compensation shifts from 
salary and pension values to option compensation, the small numerical increase (1.2% to 1.3% of 
firm value) corresponding to most of the difference.  This was generally true throughout various 
risk levels; however, the risk aversion value of 1.0 was substantially different than neighboring 
risk aversion levels; this was likely due to the removal of several significant owner-manager 
outliers that had unsolvable contracts. In this example, the $11.264 million median observed 
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pension contract was reduced to only $7.133 million; however, only a small minority of pension 
values reported significant values at this level. Many more pensions at all risk levels reported 
negative optimal contract values. Non-CEOs offered more consistent optimal contracts under the 
LA model (we believe due to the absence of owner-managers), with the greatest mispricing 
between optimal and observed contracts occurring at γ=0.2.  
 Generally, the concentration of large, dividend paying firms headed by owner-managers 
would explain why the contracts in the LA model were less optimal for CEOs. However, non-
CEO contracts, while not consistent across risk levels, offered optimal contracts that were 
improvements in total cost over observed contracts. In all cases we observe the same 
relationship: optimal contracts allocate less money to salary and pensions than observed 
contracts.  
 In Table IV, we offer a comparison of CRRA and LA models. Using our sample of 828 
executives, Panel A presents the median difference between CRRA and LA piecewise linear 
contracts for seven given levels of risk aversion, γ. Following Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010), 
we present the ***, **, and *  values indicating the significance of the Wilcoxson signed rank 
test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. We find that under all forms of compensation 
(salary, stock, option, and pension), the two models produced substantially different values. 
Typically, the CRRA produced higher values for salary, options, and pensions than the LA 
model, which offered greater stock-based compensation.  
Panel B looks at the percent of optimal contracts with positive holdings for salary, stock, 
options, and pensions; intuitively, it demonstrates the relative viability of either compensation 
models. We find that relative to prior research, the addition of the pension variable increases the 
number of positive executive holdings substantially. On average, we find that the salary, stock, 
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option, and pension values reported 76%, 59%, 84%, and 69% positive values when γ=1 for the 
CRRA model, and 62%, 57%, 73%, and 44% for the LA model. This compares favorably to 
Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010), who found approximately 25%, 2%, and 0.3% (Salary, Stock, 
and Options) of contracted values to be positive for the CRRA model and 48%, 21%, and 19% 
for the LA model at the mid-range of their compensation contracts. We found that the CRRA 
model had appreciably better results than the LA model, and both offered a greater number of 
positive (and viable) contract solutions. We consider negative solutions non-viable, since we 
have no widely-accepted proxy for ‘negative options’ or ‘negative pensions’. The addition of the 
pension variable generally increased the number of viable contracts in both the CRRA and LA 
models.  
In Table V, we consider the general non-linear CRRA and LA models. The non-linear 
model does not generate specific output for each of the compensation categories. However, it is 
able to determine the optimal ‘cost’ of the contract, relative to the contract input. Using the same 
seven risk aversion levels, we generate the medians of our results for all executives (Panel A), 
CEOs only (Panel B), and non-CEO executives (Panel C). We find that the non-linear models 
produced many more unviable contracts than piecewise linear models, and median contract cost 
across all executives were typically much more variable. In Panel A, we found that the CRRA 
model generated better optimal contracts than the LA model, with lowest optimal contract Cost 
occurring at low and mid-range levels of risk aversion. For the LA model, all median values 
were negative, driven mainly by the CEO contracts (Panel B). We suspect that the large presence 
of owner-managers among the CEO dataset contributed to poor performance of the LA model. 
 When we consider non-CEO executives, we find that both CRRA and LA models 
generate viable results, especially on mid to high levels of risk aversion. The models (especially 
115 
 
the LA model) imply that significant cost savings can occur by following the optimal contract 
costs. Under this metric, most observed contracts are significantly overpriced and above their 
optimal equivalent. The high volatility of the database and the difficulty of explaining the 
observed contracts indicate this model needs significant refinement when compared to the 
piecewise CRRA and LA models.  
 
5.1 Results of our Empirical Model 
Lastly, we test the results of our Tobit regression in Table VI. Using our database of 
piecewise linear CRRA contracts and executive averages across all risk-aversion levels, we find 
support for the argument that pensions increase contract mispricing among all executives. We 
also find that this is partially balanced by the negative coefficient on stock awards; pensions 
increase contract mispricing, stock awards reduce mispricing. This is consistent with agency 
theory: higher equity awards will align the agents with shareholders and allow for more accurate 
contract pricing. Pensions, aligning the interests of the executives with bondholders, will skew 
the contract determination. The Gompers “G” Index was also significantly positive, implying 
that greater agency costs contribute to additional contract mispricing. The Babchuk “E” Index, a 
refinement of the G-Index, was uncharacteristically negative. We suspect that the drivers of the 
contract mispricing are found among the 18 unique Gompers agency characteristics not included 
in the E-Index.  
When looking at CEOs individually, we find that these relationships were even stronger. We 
report the same, consistent results: higher pension levels among executives result in greater 
contract mispricing, high stock awards with less mispricing. Non-CEO executives, however, 
offered several unique results. When looking at these executives, we find no support for 
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governance, salary, or pension variables affecting contract mispricing. Awarding executives 
stock options, thereby aligning their interests with the shareholders, generated lower levels of 
contract mispricing.    
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We recalibrated the optimal compensation model used by Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010) 
and added an additional pension compensation variable. By doing so, we are the first paper to 
our knowledge to include pensions and apply non-CEO executives to this modeling framework.  
In both the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and loss-averse (LA) models, optimal 
compensation for executives generally included less salary and pension values and greater option 
awards.  We also found that the additional pension variable generated significantly more positive 
(and viable) optimal contracts than prior research. Lastly, we tested contract mispricing – the 
difference between the observed and optimal compensation contract costs – using a Tobit model. 
We found support for our hypothesis that higher pensions are a contributor of greater contract 
mispricing among CEOs, but not for non-CEO executives. Stock awards for CEOs and options 
for non-CEO executives better aligned observed contracts to their optimal equivalents.  
 The study of optimal compensation contracts, especially in this framework, is a new and 
developing science. While Dittman, Maug, and Spalt (2010) find strong support for the loss-
aversion contract, our research found greater consistency in solutions from an application of the 
constant relative risk-aversion model. Both piecewise models were fairly consistent, and both 
should be considered as viable options for stakeholders to analyze executive compensation. 
Pensions, still generally overlooked in compensation research, remain a divisive issue. We 
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expect that with greater pension transparency, additional research will further demonstrate the 
necessity of including them as a function of compensation contracts.  
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Table 1: Overview of Dataset 
This table provides an overview of the sample following the procedure outlined in Dittman, Maug, and 
Spalt (2010). For each of the main component variables of the models, we present mean, standard deviation, 
and 25%, 50%, and 75% quantiles. Panel A consists of our entire sample database of 828 executives from 
2000 to 2008. Panel B considers the main compensation variables for 455 CEOs, and Panel C applies the 
same methodology to 373 non-CEO executives. Stock, Options, and Fixed salary are dollar values provided 
by Execucomp; Pension values are computed via the methodology explained in the text; Non-firm wealth 
follows the procedure outlined by Ingolf Dittmann
22
; Firm Value is computed via the ending year stock 
price multiplied by shares outstanding; Strike Price is the computed option strike Maturity multiplied by 
shares outstanding; Moneyness is the Strike Price divided by Firm Value; Maturity is the computed average 
maturity on the executives’ option portfolio; Stock Volatility and Dividend Rate are determined via annual 
data. Dollar amounts are in millions; stock and option values reflect size relative to firm value. 
Panel A: All Executives (N = 828) 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75% 
Stock nS 1.41% 6.94% 0.02% 0.10% 1.04% 
Options nO 1.65% 3.81% 0.00% 0.01% 1.84% 
Fixed salary φ 2.04 1.84 0.94 1.45 2.53 
Pension ρ 998 16.08 082 2.93 14.00 
Non-firm wealth W0 28.19 50.02 5.43 13.33 30.51 
Firm Value P0 26,261 47,863 5,466 10,436 22,096 
Strike price K 25,874 52,304 4,929 9,256 19,554 
Moneyness K/P0 94.5% 41.1% 75.5% 90.7% 1038% 
Maturity T 5.14 2.85 4.02 7.00 7.00 
Stock volatility σ 0.415 0.214 0.273 0.382 0.512 
Dividend rate d 0.024 0.022 0.011 0.020 0.032 
       Panel B: CEOs Only (N = 455) 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75% 
Stock nS 2.51% 9.33% 0.30% 0.94% 1.69% 
Options nO 2.72% 4.81% 0.34% 1.73% 4.28% 
Fixed salary φ 255 1.90 1.27 2.03 3.13 
Pension ρ 17.30 18.72 6.27 12.65 21.36 
Non-firm wealth W0 35.96 60.24 9.25 17.72 40.30 
       Panel C: Non-CEO Executives Only (N =373) 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75% 
Stock nS 0.04% 0.05% 0.01% 0.02% 0.05% 
Options nO 001% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
Fixed salary φ 1.48 1.63 0.68 1.01 1.59 
Pension ρ 1.29 2.28 0.34 0.78 1.38 
Non-firm wealth W0 20.92 34.41 4.25 9.25 24.95 
                                                          
22
 See “Estimates of Executive Non-Firm Wealth” accessible here: 
http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/documentation_of_wealth_estimate.pdf 
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Table 2: Optimal Piecewise Linear Contracts, CRRA Model 
This table provides the optimal piecewise linear contract for our sample executives under the constant relative 
risk aversion (CRRA) framework. This table displays the median values of the four output parameters of the 
matlab model: salary, stock, option, and pension values. We also include median values of EU, the estimated 
utility, UPPS, the utility-adjusted pay-for-performance sensitivity, and Cost, the estimated cost of the contract 
over the tenure of employment. Panel A includes all 828 executives using seven different risk aversion 
parameters, γ. Panel B limits the sample to only CEO’s; Panel C includes just non-CEO executives. Salary and 
Pension values in millions; Stock and Option values reflect decimal share of company value. 
Panel A: All Executives 
N = 828 
 
Risk aversion parameter, γ 
 
Median 
Input 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 3 6 20 
Salary 1.459 1.234 1.184 1.119 1.114 1.177 1.159 1.500 
Stock 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Option 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Pension 3.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EU 5.032 5.012 4.683 4.323 1.534 -0.014 0.000 0.000 
UPPS 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cost 512.083 507.493 488.016 471.086 479.350 507.461 465.476 437.417 
Panel B: CEOs Only 
N = 455 
 
Risk aversion parameter, γ 
 
Median 
Input 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 3 6 20 
Salary 2.031 1.888 1.773 1.696 1.692 1.619 1.621 2.491 
Stock 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Option 0.016 0.024 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.015 
Pension 12.256 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.003 
EU 13.840 13.661 11.568 7.913 2.720 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
UPPS 0.013 0.014 0.010 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cost 1722.747 1722.739 1712.027 1695.223 1708.463 1716.418 1668.493 1668.473 
Panel C: Non-CEO Executives Only 
N= 373 
 
Risk aversion parameter, γ 
 
Median 
Input 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 3 6 20 
Salary 1.001 0.932 0.915 0.887 0.893 0.978 0.947 0.978 
Stock 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Option 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pension 0.756 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EU 1.091 1.088 1.207 1.929 0.000 -0.444 -0.138 -0.001 
UPPS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cost 77.751 77.751 77.209 76.607 75.024 75.869 75.090 75.090 
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Table 3: Optimal Piecewise Linear Contracts, LA Model 
This table provides the optimal piecewise linear contract for our sample executives under the loss aversion 
(LA) framework. This table displays the median values of the four output parameters of the matlab model: 
salary, stock, option, and pension values. We also include median values of EU, the estimated utility, UPPS, 
the utility-adjusted pay-for-performance sensitivity, and Cost, the estimated cost of the contract over the tenure 
of employment. Panel A includes all 828 executives using seven different risk aversion parameters, γ. Panel B 
limits the sample to only CEO’s; Panel C includes just non-CEO executives. Salary and Pension values in 
millions; Stock and Option values reflect decimal share of company value. 
Panel A: All Executives 
N = 828 Input 
Median 
Risk aversion parameter, γ 
 
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 3 6 20 
Salary 1.331 0.936 0.641 0.910 0.642 1.003 1.019 0.987 
Stock 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Option 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pension 2.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EU 2.674 2.757 3.605 3.605 1.386 3.593 3.561 3.503 
UPPS 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Cost 367.767 376.390 383.069 419.806 192.846 421.884 431.807 393.962 
Panel B: CEOs Only 
N = 455 Input 
Median 
Risk aversion parameter, γ 
 
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 3 6 20 
Salary 1.914 1.274 1.481 1.467 1.423 1.470 1.481 1.348 
Stock 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Option 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.007 0.015 0.015 0.014 
Pension 11.264 0.003 0.003 0.003 7.133 0.003 0.003 0.003 
EU 10.818 10.818 11.370 11.370 7.434 11.229 11.453 10.935 
UPPS 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Cost 1475.752 1475.752 1625.382 1621.393 814.005 1625.382 1609.642 1517.443 
Panel C: Non-CEO Executives Only 
N= 373 Input 
Median 
Risk aversion parameter, γ 
 
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 3 6 20 
Salary 0.929 0.820 0.051 0.661 0.783 0.828 0.834 0.834 
Stock 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Option 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pension 0.653 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EU 0.683 0.705 0.308 0.601 0.704 0.766 0.750 0.761 
UPPS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cost 72.195 73.304 17.697 54.386 69.749 74.607 75.090 75.090 
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Table 4: Comparison of Risk Aversion and Loss Aversion Models 
This table presents a comparsion of the CRRA (risk aversion) and LA (loss aversion) models. Using our 
sample of 828 executives, Panel A presents the median difference between CRRA and LA piecewise 
linear contracts for seven given levels of risk aversion, γ. Following Dittman, Maug, and Spal t (2010), 
we present the ***, **, and *  values indicating the significance of the Wilcoxson signed rank test for 
zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Panel B looks at the percent of optimal contracts with 
positive holdings for salary, stock, options, and pensions; intuitively, it demonstrates the relative 
viability of either compensation models.  
Panel A: CRRA - LA 
γ Salary 
 
Stock  
 
Option 
 
Pension 
 0.1 0.026048*** -0.000044*** 0.000043*** 0.000000*** 
0.2 0.163988*** -0.000045*** 0.000040*** 0.000000 
 0.5 0.017268*** -0.000042*** 0.000027*** 0.000005*** 
1 0.015072*** -0.000030*** 0.000035*** 0.000027*** 
3 0.005280*** -0.000035*** 0.000017*** 0.000030*** 
6 0.006636*** -0.000038*** 0.000011*** 0.000001*** 
20 0.035472*** -0.000081*** 0.000030*** 0.000000*** 
Panel B: Percent with Positive Holdings 
 
Salary Stock Option Pension 
γ CRRA LA CRRA LA CRRA LA CRRA LA 
0.1 81.6% 71.4% 63.2% 62.3% 90.0% 82.3% 58.3% 49.0% 
0.2 79.2% 60.9% 60.4% 53.3% 86.5% 71.8% 59.5% 47.0% 
0.5 77.7% 68.9% 57.4% 59.4% 85.2% 81.7% 67.9% 48.6% 
1 76.2% 61.8% 58.5% 57.1% 83.5% 73.3% 69.3% 44.1% 
3 78.4% 74.4% 61.2% 64.5% 82.8% 85.8% 72.9% 50.4% 
6 78.2% 74.8% 60.2% 64.8% 82.5% 86.2% 70.9% 51.1% 
20 80.5% 73.9% 50.1% 64.7% 85.6% 85.3% 58.0% 50.0% 
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Table 5: Optimal Non-Linear Contract Costs, CRRA and LA Models 
This table provides the optimal non-Linear contract costs for our sample executives under both the constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) the loss aversion (LA) framework. This table displays the median values of the 
total contract cost values, the only compensation output of the non-linear models in Matlab. Panel A includes all 
695 executives with calculable contracts using seven different risk aversion parameters, γ. Panel B limits the 
sample to only CEO’s; Panel C includes just non-CEO executives. 
 
Panel A: All Executives 
  Input 
Median 
Risk aversion parameter, γ 
  0.1 0.2 0.5 1 3 6 20 
CRRA 444.3044 18.20484 18.20484 113.1381 0 56.64414 59.20647 51.68361 
LA 705.0036 -4.21767 0 -1.25358 0 -2.05149 -3.18618 -3.76785 
                  
Panel B: CEOs Only 
  Input 
Median 
Risk aversion parameter, γ 
  0.1 0.2 0.5 1 3 6 20 
CRRA 1582.562 244.113 244.113 695.1211 0 107.4931 65.3723 51.02004 
LA 1764.319 -12.8353 -12.512 -12.4083 -6.01439 -12.512 -12.8254 -12.872 
                  
Panel C: Non-CEO Executives Only 
  Input 
Median 
Risk aversion parameter, γ 
  0.1 0.2 0.5 1 3 6 20 
CRRA 76.98887 -1.20959 -1.20959 7.905636 -5.31705 27.62715 55.06863 53.79019 
LA 97.20889 30.37556 0 7.82646 23.05171 27.37915 27.61185 29.64233 
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Table 6: Tobit model of Contract Mispricing 
This table considers the factors that determine mispriced contracts. The dependent variable, Misprice, is defined 
as  the absolute value of (Optimal Contract Cost – Actual Contract Cost) / (Contract Cost), averaged over seven 
risk aversion levels for each executive. The independent variables include Size, firm market capitalization; 
SalBonus, the value of salaries and bonuses offered to executives, Stocks, stock award values; Options, the 
option award value (determined via Core and Guay, 2002); Pension, the actuarial pension value; Leverage, the 
firm’s debt-to-equity ratio; CAPX, firm capital expenditures scaled by asset size; Volatility, one-year stock 
volatility; ExcessStock; excess returns of the firm’s stock in relation to market performance; G-index, or gomers 
index, a governance measure based on Gompers et al. (2003); and E-index, or entrenchment index, based on 
Bebchuk et al. (2009). The final measurable sample included 600 executive data-years, consisting of 329 CEOs 
and 271 non-CEO executives. The Tobit regression includes robust standard errors.  
 
Dependent Var: Misprice 
All 
Executives 
 
CEOs  
 
Non-CEO 
Executives 
      Size -0.00018 
 
-0.00015 
 
-0.00038* 
 
(-1.15) 
 
(-0.59) 
 
(-1.85) 
SalBonus -0.00065 
 
-0.00313 
 
0.00410 
 
(-0.24) 
 
(-1.04) 
 
(0.75) 
Stocks -0.00001** 
 
-0.00009*** 
 
-0.00001 
 
(-2.37) 
 
(-2.75) 
 
(-1.05) 
Options -0.00004 
 
0.00012 
 
-0.00021** 
 
(-0.39) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(-2.07) 
Pension 0.00130** 
 
0.00206** 
 
0.00007 
 
(1.96) 
 
(2.33) 
 
(0.08) 
Leverage -0.73634 
 
-1.9581* 
 
0.58761 
 
(-0.56) 
 
(-1.86) 
 
(0.18) 
CAPX -0.00114 
 
0.00503 
 
-0.00282 
 
(-0.40) 
 
(0.58) 
 
(-1.01) 
Volatility 16.733 
 
-12.634 
 
56.658 
 
(0.45) 
 
(-0.30 
 
(0.98) 
ExcessStock -6.77000 
 
-17.660 
 
9.2120 
 
(-0.32) 
 
(-0.57) 
 
(0.34) 
G-Index 10.997*** 
 
12.820*** 
 
7.9983 
 
(3.22) 
 
(3.06) 
 
(1.46) 
E-Index -14.681* 
 
-24.752*** 
 
-2.5918 
 
(-1.90) 
 
(-2.79) 
 
(-0.20) 
Year Variables Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
N 600 329 271 
 
